Causes of the recent rise of worldwide military expenditures by Zuba, Martin
DIPLOMARBEIT
Titel der Diplomarbeit
“Causes of the Recent Rise of Worldwide Military
Expenditures”
Verfasser
Martin Zuba
angestrebter akademischer Grad
Magister der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften
(Mag.rer.soc.oec.)
Wien, im Mai 2010
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A140
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Diplomstudium Volkswirtschaft
Betreuer: Univ. Prof. Dr. Robert Kunst
Acknowledgements
I’d like to thank my sister and my parents who’s moral and financial
support made my studies possible. I am also grateful to Prof. Robert
Kunst who invested a lot of time into advising my diploma thesis and
helped me with every problem that arose. Very special thanks go to
Alexandra Wild for helping me cope with the enormous mass of data
and providing moral support. Finally I’d like thank all my friends who
celebrated my achievements with me and always believed in me finishing
this diploma thesis.
I
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Stylized Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Theoretical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Strategies And Doctrines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Theoretical Models 5
2.1 Arms race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 The Basic Outline of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2 Discussion of the Arms Race Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Security and the Role of the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 The Neo-Classical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 The Basic Outline of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2 Discussion of the Neo-Classical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.1 Pure public good model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.2 Joint product model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Models of Bureaucratic and Organisational Politics . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.1 Models of Bureaucratic Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.2 Models of Organisational Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5.3 Combinations of Politics and Arms Race models . . . . . . . . 15
2.5.4 Discussion of bureaucratic/political and organisational models 16
2.6 Marxist / Keynesian Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6.1 Introduction: The Effect of Military Expenditures . . . . . . . 17
2.6.2 The Underconsumption Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6.3 Monopoly Capitalism and the Defence Sector . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6.4 Stagnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6.5 Discussion of the Marxist Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
II
3 Historical Analysis 25
3.1 Defence Economics in the Cold War Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1.1 Deterrence Theory: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1.2 Deterrence and Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1.3 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.1 The End of the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.2 Peace Dividend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.3 The Scale of Disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.4 Discussion of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.5 The End of the Cold War, Disarmament, Peace Dividend, and
Economic Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 The New Geostrategic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.1 The Unipolar World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.2 Revolution in Military Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.3 Asymmetric Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.4 Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4 Empirical Analysis 37
4.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1.1 Determinants of Military Expenditures in the Post Cold War
Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1.2 The Trade-Instability Web . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1.3 Effects of Stagnation or Economic Downturn . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1.4 Publicity of the NATO Defence Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2.1 Sample Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2.2 Military Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.3 Security Web and (Potential) Enemies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2.4 Conflict Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.5 Economic Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.6 Trade-Instability Web . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.7 Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.1 Panel Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.2 Bias and Heterogeneity issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3.3 Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
III
4.4 Results and Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4.1 Determinants of Military Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4.2 Serial Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4.3 Heteroskedasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.4 Group Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.5 Political Indicators and the Trade-Insecurity Web . . . . . . . 58
4.4.6 The Role of NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4.7 Economic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.4.8 Terrorism, Battle-Related Casualties and other Global Indi-
cators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5 Conclusions 65
IV
List of Figures
1.1 Top 40 Military Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
3.1 The “Game of Chicken” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1 Number of Conflicts and Conflict Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
V
List of Tables
4.1 Between and Within Effects Estimator Comparison . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2 Basic Determinants of Military Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3 Dynamic Panel Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4 Test for Group Heterogeneity: NATO members . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5 Test for Group Heterogeneity: GDP per capita . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.6 The Trade-Instability Web . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.7 The Role of the NATO Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.8 Economic Determinants of Military Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . 63
VI
1 Introduction
1.1 Stylized Facts
World military expenditures reached 1 464 billion dollars in 2008 (SIPRI 2009).
Since then, the countries of the world are spending more money for their military
than they did during the peak of the Cold War in 1987/88. With that money, the
current (2008) development aid could be increased by the factor of 14. If only 40%
of the yearly increase in military expenditures were directed towards development
aid, the millennium development goals could be reached (United Nations 2008).
Figure 1.1: Top 40 Military Expenditures1
Worldwide total military expenditures increased during the Cold War and reached
a peak in 1987/88. The rise of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet
Union effectively ended the Cold War and caused a steady decrease in worldwide
military expenditures. This so called “decade of disarmament” lasted until about
1998/99, when military expenditures reached a low. Since then military expendi-
tures are on the rise again in most areas of the world (Stalenheim/Perdomo/
Sko¨ns 2008). Although the menace of a Third World War between super-arsenal
nuclear powers has virtually vanished, NATO countries enjoy a global hegemony
1Source(s): See section 4.2.2
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that is not even starting to be challenged by another power block and there are no
open hostilities, threats of hostilities or other aggressive tensions between the Great
Powers, governments deem military expenditures higher than during the Cold War
necessary and continue to build up their armed forces.
Various reasons have been named for this alarming development. Firstly the
period since 2001 can be characterized by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that
particularly stress the defense budgets of the United States and their allies. Secondly,
with the dissolution of the Soviet Block, ethnic wars have erupted all over the world,
partly due to the sudden absence of control that the Soviet bureaucracy exerted
on their leadership, which created power vacuums. Thirdly, the economic rise of
China, India and to some degree the economic rise of Russia has given these nations
the possibility to devote a considerable amount of money of their budgets to the
military sector. Last, terrorism and various other new challenges to national security
are said to require new expensive military equipment (Stalenheim/Perdomo/
Sko¨ns 2008, McGuire 2006).
On the other hand it might be the case that military expenditures per GDP, which
contrary to total values has been more or less steadily decreasing since the end of
World War II, have reached a “natural” minimum.
In any case a deeper investigation is necessary to determine the causes of the
recent worldwide rise in military expenditures.
1.2 Theoretical Background
The government’s decision of the defence budget is usually agreed to depend on
the – mainly economic – interests of a nation, which usually refers to the interests
of the nation’s elite (Smith 1977, Griffin/Wallace/Devine 1982). The level
of the defence budget thus very much depends on the definition of the “national”
interest and to what extent military means are vital to reach or secure that interest.
Questions such as “How can the military contribute to the economic well being of
a society?” are important in order to understand the government’s motives. This
is why my thesis starts in its first section with models of this relation: The “neo-
classical model” of demand for military expenditures focuses on the maximization of
utility through a trade-off between security and consumption. Another model, the
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“arms race”, focuses on military competition between two rival countries and models
the demand for military expenditures as a function of the rivals’ defence budget.
While the Richardson (1960) Model consists of two differential equations, more
sophisticated models include electoral cycles, perceived level of threat etc. Perhaps
a synthesis of both models is the “security web” (Rosh 1988), which modifies the
neo-classical model. It introduces defence budgets of neighbours and rivals.
1.3 Strategies And Doctrines
Although the theories mentioned above have some explanatory power, it could be
the case that the determinants of military expenditure are unique for every country
and that it is difficult to find a common model that fits everywhere. After all, how
much a nation invests in its military does not only depend on its environment but
also on the decision of the leaders how to act in this environment and which role
the country should play in the international community. In the “Western World”,
there are countries like Iceland, which does not have a military at all, as well as
military Great Powers such as the United States. Keeping that in mind, it seems
unlikely that the geostrategic environment alone provides a good basis for a model.
The third chapter will therefore analyse the strategic environments and resulting
challenges and ambitions of the actors. Beginning with the Cold War era, I will
review containment and deterrence theories, as those theories were fundamental in
explaining the behaviour of western states. Furthermore I will try to assess the
impacts that the end of the Cold War as well as various previously named “new
challenges” have on the necessity to spend money for the military in the post Cold
War world.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
With the results from chapter one and two in mind, I will test the key hypotheses
with data on military expenditures. Data sources and estimation methods are dis-
cussed in detail in chapter four. The main hypotheses that I plan to test are the
influences of economic, political and strategic variables on military expenditures.
In order to test these hypotheses I will construct a working model of demand
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for military expenditure. Macroeconomic data such as the gross domestic product
(GDP) will be the basic economic variable. An analysis of this component’s co-
efficient will help to assess whether military expenditures per GDP has reached a
“natural low”. Data on the strategic environment include occurrence of wars in the
proximity of a nation as well as the military expenditures of neighbours, allies or
rivals (if any). Various dummy variables classify the countries depending on their
wealth and membership in alliances. I also plan to test the explanatory power of
other explanations for the recent rise in military expenditures such as commitment
in conflicts, war frequency and terrorism or economic growth. Results will be sum-
marized in the last part of the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter.
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2 Theoretical Models
2.1 Arms race
2.1.1 The Basic Outline of the Model
The Quaker meteorologist Richardson was one of the first to ask the question, why
nations are “increasing their armaments as if they were mechanically compelled to
do so” (Richardson 1960, p. 11). His paper marks the beginning of research in
the field of demand for military expenditures. Richardson’s attempt to use his
mathematical skills to solve the question focuses on an arms race between two rival
nations. The military build-up of one nation causes a reaction in its rival’s military
budget. Thus, dynamics emerge that can lead to an exponential arms race.
In his model, three main factors determine the dynamics of an arms race: Firstly,
a measure of “reaction”, which in Richardson’s case is a linear function of the en-
emy’s military budget and portrays the need of the nation to counter enemy military
potential with equal forces. Reaction will increase if fear of an enemy attack becomes
more prevalent. The second term is the “fatigue” coefficient, which describes the
country’s resistance to large armament programmes. This represents the unwilling-
ness of the decision maker to commit the nation to a large military programme and
its opportunity costs. The third factor is called the “grievance term” and reflects the
country’s ambition to battle the enemy nation. This grievance term is independent
of other variables and can be positive or negative.
Embedded in a system of linear differential equations describing the annual change
of military expenditure levels, Richardson (1960) gives the following set of equa-
tions:
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dMi
dt
= riMj − fiMi + gi (2.1)
dMj
dt
= rjMi − fjMj + gj (2.2)
where M denotes military expenditures, r and f denote reaction and fatigue coeffi-
cients and g denotes the grievance term. The subscripts allow for differences among
those coefficients between the two rival nations i and j.
Depending on the values of the coefficients, there are four possible outcomes of an
arms race. Firstly, there could be a stable equilibrium where dMi
dt
= 0 and
dMj
dt
= 0.
The levels of military expenditures of both rivals reach an optimum, where fear
equals fatigue adjusted by grievance.
However, the existence of such equilibrium does not guarantee that it will be
reached. Apart from cases where the equations have no or no meaningful solutions
it might be the case that the equilibrium is not stable and any disturbances, which
are likely to occur in international relations, will lead away from the equilibrium
even if it is ever reached.
If reaction is high enough an arms race will trigger. Since both the restricting
fatigue term and the reaction term are linear functions of military expenditures, the
arms race will never reach an equilibrium and defence budget will grow infinitely.
This is the case if rirj > fifj. In the opposite case both nations will disarm and
reach a point where no money is spent for military expenditures at all.
Since the grievance term is independent of the levels of military budget, its influ-
ence does not rise as military budgets rise. Depending on the value of the grievance
term in some cases, the starting levels of the military budgets will determine the
long-term outcome. The grievance term also shifts the equilibrium plevels of military
expenditures.
2.1.2 Discussion of the Arms Race Model
The answer that Richardson gives to his own question concerning the militaristic
behaviour of states would be that, given the coefficients, states are mechanistically
compelled to build arms, unless political intervention to stop that tendency is under-
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taken. According to Richardson (1960, p. 12), this is because of their “tradition”
and “instincts”. This approach in essence sees threats and military expenditures as
causes for military expenditures and threats, thus fails to explain why states issue
threats and what they perceive as threats.
This lack of understanding of the political role of the state is the main critique
McGinnis (1991) directs at Richardson and has caused researchers to focus on
theoretical concepts of security and the role of the state. The neo-classical model,
featuring a welfare function maximizing state facing resource constraints, is one
answer.
Bureaucratic models are an other attempt to address the political plane of arma-
ments. While complex bureaucratic models feature various actors within the state,
who have various interests in mind, bureaucratic adoptions of the Richardson model
express the longing of bureaucrats to reach a “desired” level of military expenditures,
usually increasing the last year’s budget by a certain percentage. This desired level
of military expenditures enters the differential equation and shifts the equilibrium
position of the arms race and thus changes its dynamics.
Ultimately, most refinements of Richardson’s arms race model continue his tra-
dition by explaining behaviour of states by adding factors to differential equations.
But this constitutes a description rather than an explanation. As McGinnis (1991,
p. 451) says,
“The cause of the arms race resides not in each state’s mechanistic re-
action to threat, fatigue and grievances, but rather in the fundamental
conflict of interests between rival states.”
These conflicts of interest are the cause for both arms races and wars. Richardson’s
claim, that arms races are the origin of wars, thus seems spurious, and a more
thorough analysis of the function of military defence is necessary.
2.2 Security and the Role of the State
In modern societies, the military has the explicit task of protecting the state’s ter-
ritory and its citizens from outer threats. The introduction of constitutional states
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has brought two main rules for the military. Firstly, the military exercises the
state’s monopoly of violence as far as threats from “outside” are concerned, while
maintaining public order within the society is the task of the police. Accordingly,
equipment and training of the military is designed to deter possible enemies and
to protect assets from damage or destruction in event of a war. This is achieved
by unfolding enough military power to separate assets from threats. Second, the
military is subordinate to the civil government, usually the defence ministry, which
determines the defence strategy according to the threats it perceives and doctrines
it applies (see Halteiner/Ku¨mmel 2008).
Soos (1979) points out that this clear relation between the state, society and
military did not always exist, but is the result of the military’s subordination under
civil authorities and the introduction of constitutional states. Adelman (1985)
further investigates the relation between military and the state throughout history.
Speaking in economic terms, the function of the military is to produce “security”.
In this context security is a public good because it is non-rival and non-excludable
within a society. Security is also a good example of a natural monopoly since the
expensive equipment necessary to provide it implies economics of scale. Smith
(1980) introduced the security function to express the level of freedom from attack
perceived by the society. In his model, security depends on military expenditures
and the “strategic environment”. Thus the security function has the form:
S = S(M,E) (2.3)
Instead of the annual rates of military expenditures, stocks could be used. With
better data available, we could use depreciated stocks of military equipment plus
annual rates of operative costs, however this is not the case for most countries.
Threat
Similarly to security, threat is the key determinant of how much military expendi-
tures are necessary to guarantee a certain level of security. In analogy to security,
we can define threat as probability and strength of an enemy attack against own
assets, capable of lowering the level of utility. Following this definition, threat is
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per se unobservable. However, in the case of modelling the demand for military
expenditures, a decision taken by officials or politicians who cannot observe threat
as well, it is reasonable to think of the threat variable as perceived threat. This is
usually designedas a function of “enemy” military expenditures.
2.3 The Neo-Classical Model
2.3.1 The Basic Outline of the Model
The neoclassical model regards the decision of how much military expenditures are
necessary as a trade-off between military spending and civilian expenditures. The
GDP is the sole resource, representing the total economic capability of the society,
and the government devotes a certain fraction of it to the military, so that the
welfare function is maximized:
max!U = U(C,M) (2.4)
where U denotes utility, M denotes military expenditures and C denotes expendi-
tures on all other good.
This welfare function could, for example, be derived from the median voter’s
preferences. The welfare function could however also originate from the mind of a
benevolent dictator, who has the ability to state the ideal welfare function consid-
ering all citizens, or even from the management office of an arms manufacturer (see
Smith 1980).
In order to determine the optimum, it is necessary to consider the budget restraint:
max!U = U(C, S(M,E)) (2.5)
where Y denotes income, pC and pC denote relative prices and S denotes the security
function.
Applying the rule that in the optimum marginal utility per cost-unit of both
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goods2 must be the same3, the optimum is characterized by:
∂U
∂C
pC
=
∂U
∂S
∂S
∂M
pM
(2.6)
Under the quite logical assumption of monotonic decreasing partial utility of non-
military consumption, loosening the budget restraint, i.e. a rising GDP, will also
lead to a higher military budget. This means that a richer society will simply spend
more money on the military because it has the means to do so. Note that it is
not clear whether the share of income that will go to the military will increase or
decrease. Steadily decreasing shares of the military sector over time however seem
to indicate that the partial utility of military production decreases faster than the
partial utility derived from non-military production.
Also, military expenditures will obviously change if the utility function U changes.
This indicates that if less military expenditures are deemed necessary, this is because
the decision deems security less important or because the situation is more favourable
so that less military expenditures are required to maintain the same level of security.
The security function helps to distinguish between these two cases, as changes in the
strategic environement are made distinguishable from changes in the utility function.
2.3.2 Discussion of the Neo-Classical Model
The neo-classical model sees the demand of military expenditures in a ways charac-
teristic for economics. In a world of scarce resources it optimizes utility by allocating
resources to the defence and non-defence sectors, so that marginal utility is equal.
This straightforward approach cuts to the point of having a military, which ulti-
mately is – as always in economics – to enjoy utility, specifically to enjoy security.
The only open questions are how exactly to define the corresponding functions,
and once that is clear, so is the optimal level of military expenditures. Reality
however is not that simple. The fact that utility functions need to be known is the
first obstacle. Some authors (e.g. Sandler/Hartley 1995) derive the society’s
2Military goods do not generate utility per se, but rather through the increase in security they
provide.
3This is not true in case of a boundary solution. However, since with virtually no exception every
state possesses a military force, it is safe to rule out that option.
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utility function from the median voter’s preferences. This assumes the median voter
has clearly stated preferences and that we live in a form of democracy that in fact
executes the median voter’s preference regarding the level of military expenditures.
Both assumptions are highly questionable. Smith (1980) points out that the me-
chanics of the neo-classical work out no matter how the functions are derived. They
could very well be dictated by the arms lobby itself. However, this is not what
models of demand of military expenditure examine. For a realistic representation of
the mechanisms which determine arms build-up, the functions need to be correct.
Otherwise the neoclassical models will perform inadequate when tested with real
data.
The question also remains of what security covers. Germany prior to the Second
World War is a good example of a nation that obviously spent more money on its
army than was necessary to guarantee defence from threats, but rather planned to
defeat and occupy her neighbours. The utility of her arms build-up is generated
by the loot pillaged from the occupied countries rather than absence of threats.
The neoclassical model is usually pointed out to describe a peaceful nation, however
security might cover some “preventive” action to eliminate threats. This proves that
not only the level of threat determines the response but that the general situation
a country faces might push it in the one or other direction. Generally, it is difficult
to draw a line between defensive and agressive military actions.
To put it in the nutshell, the viability of the neo-classical model depends largely on
how well the utility and security functions are defined. Any additional information
such as political stability, applied doctrines or decision finding mechanisms will
improve the results if applied correctly.
2.4 Alliances
One of the key issues of the neo-classical model is the correct assessment of the
strategic environment. Basically, this concept covers several factors important for a
country’s security: (1) the defence resources provided by its own or allied military
forces, representing the capabilities to deter aggression or limit danger in case of a
war, (2) enemy nations’ military capacities, and thus their potential to inflict dam-
age in case of war, (3) estimates of threat, i.e. the probabilities that the country will
become target of an attack by a certain enemy nation and (4) geographic consider-
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ations, which might allow the use of natural barriers to aid defence and improving
security this way.4 This chapter will deal with the role of alliances in contributing
to the defence capabilities of a country.
A wide variety of literature exists that deals with the question of international
institutions, their purpose and the motives of nations to join them (e.g. Sny-
der 1997). Since it would go well beyond the scope of this work to analyse these
issues in depth, I will assume alliance membership and international relations as
given and focus on the effects of these alliances on the behaviour of the states.
2.4.1 Pure public good model
The pure public good theory assumes that every alliance member profits not only
from her own military expenditures, but from the sum of the alliance’s efforts. The
idea behind is that the key purpose of an alliance is deterrence. Since the alliance
will respond in full force to an attack against any of its members, the total military
capability of the alliance determines the deterrence potential. Thus, security is
provided by own plus allied military expenditures:
Si = Si(
∑
i
Mi, Ei) (2.7)
As Sandler/Hartley (1995, p. 19) point out, this concept of alliance benefits
has several implications. Firstly there are no limits to the size of the alliance,
since any new member makes a contribution to the security level of the alliance.
Secondly, since small members have limited capabilities of changing their security
status, they will more likely substitute military goods with non-military production
than larger states, whose military budget will have a larger impact on their own
security. Generally we have to expect a free rider problem, leading to a lower than
Pareto-optimal level of military spending. Governments won’t consider positive
effects of their military production’s spill-ins to other countries while they see their
allies’ defence efforts as perfect substitute to their own military programs.
4In panel data, these geographic factors can be considered constant over time and to be repre-
sented by the country dummy.
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2.4.2 Joint product model
Van Ypersele de Strihou (1967) points out that there are military goods that
are not entirely public within the alliance. On the one hand, military resources may
be rival in the sense that if they are deployed in one area, they cannot be used
somewhere else – a phenomenon called “force thinning”. This is especially relevant
in the case of defending borders with conventional forces and is a good example
demonstrating that an alliance does not always gain if a new member joins – it
could be the case that having to defend this country outweighs the benefits.
Another major factor of non-public benefits of military programs are the economic
benefits they create, such as unemployment, research & development incentives and
general stimulus to the economy. While it is true that efficient non-military govern-
ment spending can probably provide the same effect at a cheaper cost it is likely that
economic incentives of military programs are taken into account when determining
the optimal level of military expenditures. Van Ypersele de Strihou (1967),
who contributes to the debate of how defence costs should be shared in NATO, sug-
gests that these private benefits from military programs should be subtracted from
the military expenditures / GDP ratio used to compare NATO defence burdens.
The publicness of the defence good may vary over time and depend on the enemy
the alliance faces and the way it plans to fight it. An alliance that bases its defence
on deterrence will profit from allied military expenditures to a much higher degree
than an alliance that is relying on conventional arms. Likewise, nuclear deterrence
will prove more effective against a well identified nation than against individual
terrorists or rogue organisations. If an alliance is at war, deterrence has failed and
the remaining defence effort is much more likely to be subject to force thinning.
2.5 Models of Bureaucratic and Organisational Politics
2.5.1 Models of Bureaucratic Organisation
Basic bureaucratic models bear a resemblance with Richardson arms race models.
They explain usually rising military expenditures by the fact that the bureaucracy
in the armed forces strives for controlling a larger budget every year. The desired
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military budget thus is
mt = cMt−1 (2.8)
where c > 1.
2.5.2 Models of Organisational Politics
Models of organisational politics investigate the interaction of institutions involved
in determining the military budget. The task of the theory of organisational politics
is to find reasonable simplifications that allow a systematic, testable model of these
complex interactions. Ostrom (1977) uses a model that focuses on four basic
decision guidelines: Experience (past observations), simplification (ignoring complex
context), satisficing instead of optimizing and an incremental approach.
In the simplest model of organisational politics, military expenditures are deter-
mined by the armed service’s request and Congress’ decision of how much of this
sum will be granted (see Davis/Dempster/Wildavsky 1974).
mt = aMt−1 + ut (2.9)
Mt = bmt + vt (2.10)
Here, the armed services request a proportional amount of the last year’s budget
for the next year (for example so as to make approval more likely). Congress in return
approves a certain percentage of the armed service’s request, probably because it
believes that the request is quite sound, but exaggerated. Thus, a > 1 and b < 1.
A more sophisticated model by Davis/Dempster/Wildavsky (1974) includes
five steps: The request from the armed services, the President’s budget proposal, the
budget approved by Congress, the defence ministry’s additional appropriations and
de-facto military expenditures. The defence budget thus is the result of the inter-
action between this “conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organisations, each
with a substantial life of their own” (Ostrom 1978, p. 942 citing Allison 1971),
expressed in the coefficients ai.
5 Depending on the political realities these institu-
5Note that for this model to make sense at all it is necessary to have data on the actual values of
defence budget proposed by the various organisational units available, otherwise the reduced
form of these equations will suffer from collinearity.
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tions face, such as elections or the need to gather support for their agenda, their
individual decision function could be seen as depending on the median voter’s pref-
erences, being subject to lobbyism etc. This however does not change the basic
functions of the model.
2.5.3 Combinations of Politics and Arms Race models
Ostrom (1978) links models of organisational politics and arms race models. The
motivation of this approach so seems obvious: On the one hand, both models fail
to explain U.S. military expenditures, as Ostrom (1977) argues in the second part
of his paper. On the other hand, the shortcomings of each model include the non-
consideration of the other model’s primary focus. While the arms race model was
often criticised for neglecting domestic political factors, the main critique on the
purely organisational models is that they try to explain defence expenditures without
considering who takes the decisions.
This “reactive linkage model” adds environmental stimuli to the decision functions
of the organisational units: The Soviet Union’s defence expenditures (X1) and U.S.
military battle deaths (X2). The trend in congressional appropriation of defence
budget levels is the only “organisational” explanatory variable (X3) and corresponds
to the coefficients ai in section 2.5.2. Thus the model takes the form:
mi,t = ai,tHi,t +
∑
i
∑
j
bi,jXj,t + ui,t (2.11)
where i denotes the four organisational units armed services, President, Congress
and Defense Ministry, H represents historical basis and ai,t as well as bi,j are coef-
ficients. Note that the coefficients of the explanatory variables X are organisation-
sensitive, which makes it possible for different organisational units to react differently
to environmental stimuli.
In Ostrom’s specification the armed services are the only institution that con-
siders “enemy” (i.e. Soviet) military expenditures in its decision function. Besides
that, figues of battle-related casualties also play a role. The effect of battle deaths
is supposed to cover not only replacements but is also an indicator of commitments
the U.S. military requires money for other than deterring the Soviet Union, the scale
of which can be indicated by the number of casualties.
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The President and Congress play a similar role and consider the diplomatic and
financial situation of the nation. The latter, resembling “fatigue” in the arms race
model, is particularly attributed to the Congress as the custodian of the American
tax money. This is represented by a coefficient which cuts a certain proportion of
the military budget. As previous decisions of Congress are part of the “histori-
cal” knowledge of institutions, they are capable of taking advantage of Congress’
“moods”.
2.5.4 Discussion of bureaucratic/political and organisational models
Bureaucratic models try to explain the level of defence expenditures as a result
of the political process that decides the national budget. They do so by defining
decision rules for political actors. Most of these models are very simple as this
decision function is a linear function depending on someone else’s decision or the
previous year’s defence budget. This raises doubt concerning the validity of this
approach, since any more or less steady adjustment of military expenditures over
time will yield acceptable results for these models. This makes interpreting the
results especially difficult, since little is said about why political actors behave the
way they do.
Rosh (1988, p. 681) sums up why, although models whose main feature is a per-
cent increase provide significant results, the challenge is to find alternative models:
“[E]ven if the best predictor of how the universe looks today is a de-
scription of the universe the day before, that should not prevent one
from finding the underlying causes that shaped the universe in the first
place. A number of internal factors that may affect defense allocations
are theoretically more interesting and empirically more easily testable
than incrementalism.”
The degree of detail and specialisation of Ostrom’s model is very high. McGinnis
(1991) criticises that this imposes too harsh restrictions on the actor’s abilities to
base their decisions on all available information other than those specified in the
model, such as intelligence, forecasts or other kinds of expertise available to them.
He argues that
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“our models cannot, and should not, be dependent on an exact specifica-
tion of organizational structures or the particular decision rules employed
by individuals or organizations” (McGinnis 1991, p. 457).
I tend to agree with that notion. It’s usability is also limited to the United
States, since other nations probably face a different institutional setting. Smith
(1995) argues that models of demand for military expenditures provide little more
than a vague idea of what is behind a ”poorly understood“ process. Attempting to
explain it in too much detail seems bound to lead to unreliable conclusions.
There is however a theoretical justification for a linear setup of models of demand
for military expenditures. Lucier (1979) argues that, since threat evaluation is a
very complex process, decision makers do not reconsider their priorities every year.
Once they set up a ”standard operation procedure” (SOP) they delegate further deci-
sion to the bureaucracy, resulting in a proportional increase of military expenditures
until the SOP are changed. Unfortunately, revision of SOPs does not necessarily
follow traceable events such as administration changes, expiring of international
treaties or alike. A more suitable proxy might be the change of defence doctrines, as
it was implemented with success in alliance models, where flexible response changed
the degree of publicness of military expenditures within NATO.
2.6 Marxist / Keynesian Models
2.6.1 Introduction: The Effect of Military Expenditures
So far, all theoretical models considered have treated military expenditures as gov-
ernmental consumption of resources. Since resources are limited and rival, this
implies less resources are available for civil use. Since defence expenditures result
from a trade-off between consumption and security in the neo-classical model and
are a reaction to threat in the arms race model, this is an accepted loss. However,
once you consider the possibility that military expenditures can, most likely by stim-
ulating demand, cause economic growth, another possible explanation for military
demand arises. Governments opting for a positive economic effect could use military
expenditures to spur the economy. This kind of state intervention through military
expenditures is referred to as military Keynesianism.
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2.6.2 The Underconsumption Hypothesis
Other than providing an alternate specification to the welfare trade-off model, the
military Keynesian hypothesis also gives an answer to the anomaly of non-reaction.
Much research focussing on arms races comes to the conclusion that “reaction” co-
efficients are insignificant, shaking the very foundation of arms race models. This
established a branch of defence economics that derives military expenditure from
the behaviour of organisational units within governments – the bureaucratic / po-
litical models, which have been reviewed in section 2.5.1. Similar to that, Marxist
theory claims that the mechanics of the capitalist system itself promote military
expenditures. Mandel (1991, p. 9) writes:
“Kapitalismus bringt Konkurrenz mit sich. Mit dem Auftreten großer
Ko¨rperschaften und Kartelle – d.h. mit dem Beginn des Monopolkapital-
ismus – nahm diese Konkurrenz eine neue Dimension an. Sie wurde qual-
itativ mehr politisch-o¨konomisch und deshalb milita¨risch-o¨konomisch.”
While this represents a “domestic” explanation, it does not apply restrictive rules
of behaviour of organisational units but rather addresses general economic issues.
Both Marxist and Keynesian traditions grant the military a special role within the
capitalist economy, although the Marxists do so more specifically than the Keyne-
sianists. For Keynesianists, military expenditures are merely one form of government
expenditures – and, since Keynes was a liberal anti-militarist, probably not the best
one. Some Marxists however argue that the military serves a special function to
counter tendencies of underconsumption (or overproduction), which are – despite
for different reasons – a key factor in both economic theories.
2.6.3 Monopoly Capitalism and the Defence Sector
Several neo-Marxist authors have stressed the importance of the monopolized struc-
ture of the economy in late capitalism. These monopolies are characterized by a
high degree of capitalization, the ability to produce considerably more economic
surplus than competitive sectors and tight bonds with the state. Due to the inher-
ent susceptibility to economic crises, this secotr has recurring problems of realizing
or “absorbing” this surplus. Instead of reducing prices the preferred way to raise
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profits is to cut production, which is why there is a tendency towards stagnation
in monopoly capitalist economies. This tendency is countered by a series of policy
instruments, such as “improved sales and marketing techniques, epoch-making in-
ventions, imperialism, and civilian and military expenditures.” (Griffin/Devine/
Wallace 1982, p. 115).
The intentions behind the state’s economic intervention are a result of the char-
acter of the state as protector of the interests of the bourgeois class. In this respect,
the Marxist approach differs radically from the neo-classical model, which leaves out
the question if the state or the society as a whole takes the decision and finances
military expenditure.
According to the Marxist theory of the state, its prime function is to maintain
order and assist the monopoly capitalists with expanding their profits. Due to several
reasons, military expenditures are a popular way of fulfilling that role. Treddenick
(1985, p. 81) sums up the reasons which make them a particularly useful instrument:
“[T]hey do not interfere with the ability of capitalists to extract surplus
from the workers; they do not divert profitable enterprises to the gov-
ernment; they do divert resources away from capital accumulation and
hence increase the rate of profit on existing capital; and they are contin-
uously expandable as a result of rapid obsolescence arising from intense
technological competition.”
Other than that, military expenditures help to gain access to markets and maintain
the dominance over the capitalist world. Marxist authors also stress the importance
of nationalism, patriotism and militarism in helping to justify military expenditures
and ensure the support for an economic policy which is probably suboptimal com-
pared to interventionism through civilian expenditures (Treddenick 1985, p. 83).
The task of maintaining order is best achieved by integration of the working class,
i.e. their mass organisations, into the state. Griffin/Wallace/Devine (1982)
argue that a “Keynesianist Coalition” composed of supporters of New Deal-like eco-
nomic interventionism, Cold War militarists and business elite struck a deal with
union leaders to dedicate the economy to a large scale interventionism project in the
form of military expenditures. This again demonstrates the fact that defence spend-
ing is often a convenient policy, since it can serve the interest of various powerful
interest groups while alienating only a minority of the population.
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2.6.4 Stagnation
If military expenditures are caused by stagnation, for empirical analyses indicators
are necessary that capture this phenomenon. Obviously, the correct choice of prox-
ies for economic downturn, or stagnation, that causes capitalists to call for state
intervention, will make the difference between useless and suitable models to test
this hypothesis.
Griffin/Devine/Wallace (1982) try to find suitable indicators for stagnation.
The “GDP gap” and the “manufacturing gap” represent the difference between the
actual output and the hypothetical output if all unemployed workers were employed.
This however produced insignificant results. Of all their other attempts, only last
year’s economic growth rate and last year’s change in consumption were significant
in regressions controlling for standard variables.
Griffin/Wallace/Devine (1982) develop a model for military expenditure
that follows the theory of Baran/Sweezy (1966) and O’Connor (1974). They
regress the defence burden on indicators of economic health in the monopolized
sector of the economy and unemployment in the unionised sector.6 This specification
represents a system where the government is only sensitive to the needs of the certain
sectors of the economy. O’Connor (1974) argues that this is the case because the
monopoly sector is both more important to the state in terms of tax revenue and by
far more relevant for the functioning of the economy as a whole, since it holds over
90% of all corporate assets and generates about 78% of corporate profits (Griffin/
Wallace/Devine 1982, p. 126).
The results they produce with these explanatory variables are impressive. Both
unionised unemployment and last year’s change in monopoly profits are significant in
all alternative estimation equation specifications. Another interesting result is that
the best stagnation indicators of Griffin/Devine/Wallace (1982), last year’s
economic growth rate and consumption growth rate, turn insignificant once sector-
specific indicators of stagnation enter the regression equation. Geo-political and
domestic-political variables also turned out to be insignificant, with the exception
6The monopolized sector consists of the sectors “mining, construction, transportation, communi-
cations, public utilities, finance, insurance, real estate, and all durable and non-durable manu-
facturing except lumber, leather, furniture, textiles and apparel” while the unionised sector con-
sists of “mining, manufacturing, construction, transportation, and public utilities” (Griffin/
Wallace/Devine 1982, p. 125-126)
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of an “election year” dummy. It seems that administrations are much more willing
to offset stagnation with stimuli through military expenditures when there is an
election ahead.
2.6.5 Discussion of the Marxist Hypothesis
Marxist theory provides answers to many crucial questions regarding the determi-
nants of military expenditures. While the neo-classical model requires some theory
about how the welfare function is generated and will produce different results de-
pending on how this question is resolved, Marxist theory gives a plausible answer
to the question whose interests are being served by state interventionism in form of
military expenditures.
Marxist theory also addresses the anomaly of non-reaction: Threats from the
outside do not determine the level of military expenditure, militarism as well as
patriotism and nationalism rather help the state to fulfil its integrative function.
However, Marxist theory still recognizes the benefits especially the United States
reaped from having the capitalist world’s best military force at their disposal. Smith
(1977) argues that maintaining this military force also represents a substantial bur-
den to the economy and thus contributes to economic down-turn in the long run
although designed to improve the economy in the short run.
However, the detailed representation of U.S. military expenditures by Griffin/
Devine/Wallace (1982, p. 139) comes at a price. It is rather unlikely that the
model specified for the United States of America can be used for any other capitalist
power, since it bases on assumptions that may only apply to the U.S. Additionally,
interpreting the results of Griffin/Wallace/Devine (1982) is not straightfor-
ward. Even if stagnation causes military expenditures, that does not necessarily
mean that military expenditures offset stagnation, but might indicate that in face
of an economic downturn conflicts are more likely or, as neoclassical conflict theory
would say, more profitable than other economic activity.
Finally, the validity of the theoretic background of the model Griffin/Wallace/
Devine use is hotly debated among Marxists. The key question is whether spend-
ing money on the military has the effect of stalling or reversing the tendency of
the profit rate to fall or not, may it be in the short or the long run, and whether
militarism is the solution to inherent crisis susceptibility or a drain on profits. The
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“permanent arms economy” is a theory suggesting that capitalist economies use mil-
itary expenditures, which consume surplus the way luxury consumption does, with
the effect of slowing down the change of the organic composition of capital, easing
realisation problems in the long run. The author of these lines tends to agree with
Brooks (2008) in that it is unlikely that devoting resources to an (on society-wide
scale) unproductive endeavour such as arms production plays a vital role in increas-
ing economic well-being in the long run – even if arms production is probably quite
profitable for the single arms manufacturer.7
2.7 Conclusions
Most theories on military expenditures are adjustments of more general theories
to the subject of defence outlays. The neo-classical theory, for example, describes
resource allocation in general, and the idea that the defence share of GDP or total
government expenditures should follow the same pattern sums up the neo-classical
approach to military expenditures. Likewise the situation of allied countries resem-
bles any other (semi-)public good produced by individuals who face the temptation
of free-riding. The military-Keynesianist approach, by pointing out the possible pos-
itive effects on economic growth, applies Keynesian theory to military expenditures,
although military-Keynesianists need to argue why expansive policy should be done
via military as opposed to civil public spending. Finally, Marxist theory on the
determinants of the surplus rate influences Marxists’ view on military expenditures.
Thus, as this paper has argued in detail in the various chapters, all theories share
to a certain degree the theoretical issues of the theory they were inspired by. While
the neo-classical system fails to answer the important question of who decides the
utility function of the state, “institutional” models tend to be purely descriptive.
Concerning Marxist theories, the debate is characterized by different views on the
way military expenditures countervail the tendency of the surplus rate to fall, and
how the production of a good without inherent utility value affects the composition
of total surplus.
The fact that various models originating from utterly different theories are capable
of providing significant results seems to indicate that, while no explanation can claim
to explain all aspects of military expenditures, the “real” model contains elements of
7This debate is summed up in Dunne/Coulomb (2008) and Brooks (2008).
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multiple theoretical approaches. Thus, the task lies in finding useful combinations
of several theoretical models. Ostrom (1978) and Rosh (1988) are two examples
of such efforts.
Implementing this approach, my working theory of determinants for military ex-
penditures for the empirical part will assume that the military fulfils several roles.
These roles are summarized by Grey (1974) as follows:
 Deterrence: A state may engage in an arms race in order to deter
inimical military behaviour – a threat is perceived.
 Defense: A State may engage in an arms race in order to attain a
more favorable outcome if war should occur.
 Diplomacy: A state may engage in an arms race in order to increase
its diplomatic weight.
 The functional “threat”: A state may engage in an arms race be-
cause an external “pacer” of military endeavor is both convenient
and necessary to the racing “agents.”
 Vested interests: A state may engage in an arms race because its
defense policy is essentially the captive of domestic industrial, bu-
reaucratic (official), and legislative interests — all of which share
in the spoils of a high rate of defense expenditure, and all of which
therefore need an external threat.
 Reputation: A state may engage in an arms race in order to preserve
or enhance the measure of dignity or prestige it deems appropriate
(or essential).
 Technology: A state may engage in an arms race because a rapid
succession of generations of weapons technologies ensures bloc ob-
solescence if a unilateral slackening of qualitative effort is not re-
ciprocated abroad.
It could be argued that some of the functions of the military are bonuses rather
than vital functions. While it may be true that maintaining a military force yields
prestige, few countries will spend their taxpayer’s money on weapons just because
of that.
Some of these functions are rival while others are non-rival. A military force
capable of projecting power will also increase a nation’s prestige, and any arms
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project that spurs the economy will also provide security-related benefits. On the
other hand, the nuclear arsenals of the Cold War superpowers served as deterrents
but were useless in all other applications of military force, thus lost their strategic
value after the end of the Cold War. The fact that the money spent on these
deterrence weapons ceased to effectively increase security is a result from the fact
that nuclear deterrence is in this sense rival to other functions of the military.
When more means are necessary to fulfil one of those functions, military expendi-
tures will rise. Interpreting coefficients of regression estimations can help identifying
which function of the military made increased defence spending necessary. An addi-
tional variable, GDP, will express how much military expenditures can be sustained
and capture rising military expenditures resulting from easening budget constraints.
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3 Historical Analysis
3.1 Defence Economics in the Cold War Era
The initial setup of the Cold War was a direct consequence of the result of the
Second World War and deteriorating relationships between the communist Soviet
Union and the Western Allies. After the Second World War the United States
emerged as the leading capitalist nation, however with a capitalist bloc reduced
by Eastern Europe, the Balkans, China and parts of Indochina (with considerable
influence of communist parties in the rest of Indochina), France, Italy, Greece and
later Latin America. In this geostrategic situation, the only capitalist nation capable
of doing so faced the task of countering the advance of communism worldwide. This
was the key motivation for the “containment” doctrine calling for a resolute stance
against Communist activities on a worldwide scale.
Another key strategic element was the introduction of nuclear weapons to the
superpower’s arsenals in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The main effect of the
atomic bomb was to make any direct war between nuclear powers much more costly,
thus successfully deterring it. As a result deterrence theory, an offspring of realist
theory, served as key model for international relations (Jervis 1979). In the world
of the Cold War, both superpowers imposed their bipolar order on the rest of the
world, thus recreating their view of international politics.
3.1.1 Deterrence Theory: Introduction
Deterrence theory derives from the school of political realism, which sees nations
struggling for resources, influence and other given national interests in an archaic
system, in which the stronger power prevails. It provides answers to questions
such as how to project military power to gain political influence, prevail in crises
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Figure 3.1: The “Game of Chicken”
B
confront yield
A
confront −2,−2 1,−1*
yield −1, 1* 0, 0
and prevent wars. Although deterrence is possible with various kinds of weapon
systems, a nuclear arsenal combined with first and second strike capability introduce
a qualitative change in the level of threat that explains the prevalence of deterrence
theory. Since there is no way to use nuclear weapons defensively and their tactic
effectiveness (i.e. usability against military forces) is limited, deterrence is the main
function of nuclear weapons.
3.1.2 Deterrence and Game Theory
Kahn (1960) compared nuclear deterrence to the “game of chicken”. In this re-
semblance of a game played by venturesome teenagers, two drivers drive their cars
towards each other in the middle of the road. Whoever breaks or swerves first loses
and is the “chicken”, while the other teenager wins the reputation of being the
bolder one. If nobody undertakes an evasive manoeuvre the result is a crash which
causes enormous costs to both drivers.
Figure 3.1 represents the “game of chicken”. Obviously this 2x2 representation
is a simplification, since it requires players to choose their strategy before the game
starts and does not allow them to reconsider. The preferences of the players are in
this order: winning, drawing, losing, crashing.
There are three Nash-equilibria in this game. The two pure strategy Nash-
equilibria are denoted with a star. There is a third mixed strategy Nash-equilibrium
where players decide to evade or drive on depending on the exact payoffs. The
key feature of the game is that the players decide whether to evade or to drive on
depending on what they think the other player is doing, which makes it possible
to influence the opponent’s behavior by taking an aggressive or submissive stance
(provided, of course, that this is possible in the framework of the game).
In the real world, deterrence theory describes the situation when a challenger or
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aggressor tries to topple the status quo in his favor, i.e. by claiming some resource
that is in the possession of the defender. The defender then uses threat of force and
tries to change the behaviour of the aggressor. One of the two powers has to “break”
(i.e. yield) in order to prevent a full-scale nuclear war. The “game of chicken” may
be misleading in the sense that it is symmetric, while deterrence theory suggests
that the dangerous situation is deliberately caused by one power.
3.1.3 Options
During the Cold War several attempts were made by the superpowers to influence
the specification of the “game” and to gain an advantage by doing so.
One way to do so was to increase the stakes by making a commitment. The
president of the United States could, for example, announce that her administration
will resign if she did not manage to solve a certain crisis in the best interest of the
USA. This effectively raises the costs of losing and will make yielding less preferably.
The Soviet Union would therefore assume that the probability that the United States
will back down has dropped, which will make it more costly to persist, as they would
be faced with an increased chance of nuclear war. Jervis (1979, p. 315) points out
that this kind of commitment is only possible if a nation has a plausible interest (be
it a strategic or symbolic value) in the issue involved, otherwise it would be seen as
a noncredible threat.
Noncredible threats are another key issue about nuclear deterrence, especially
once both super powers obtained second-strike capabilities by deploying submarine-
based strategic missiles and sizeable stocks of land-based ICBMs. Once mutually
assured destruction is reached, nuclear deterrence would not work anymore, which
can be shown by the following example of backwards induction: Whenever faced
with the decision to start the nuclear war or not, decision makers could not press
the button since that would also mean the destruction of their own cities. Knowing
that the other side will not strike due to that very reason, aggressors could get away
with any provocative attempt to change the status quo carried out with conventional
weapons.
In deterrence theory, there are two answers to this dilemma. The theory that
leaves something to chance states that in reality, there is always a chance that
things can go wrong. By bringing such a situation about willingly (e.g. by deploying
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strategic forces in a crisis area that have limited authority to decide about the use
of their weapons themselves), leaders can force the other side to concede without
actually having to start a nuclear war. In reality, NATO generals worried by the
lack of options in the face of mutually assured destruction promoted the flexible
response doctrine, which envisioned the use of conventional forces to counter limited
aggression by the enemy. This development led to a decrease in the publicness of
the NATO defence good over time.
Finally, by obtaining equipment such as missile defence systems, nations could
reduce their losses in event of a nuclear war. This is a precondition for making a
nuclear missile exchange a feasible option and winning the Cold War for good. This
is why plans for missile defence systems such as the SDI were seen as a greater threat
to peace than a build-up in nuclear arms. Talks about limitation of anti-ballistic
missile systems were of significant importance in the negotiations conducted between
the super powers during the time of de´tente. In reality, attempts of the United
States to construct a laser missile defence were countered by the introduction of
multiple individual re-entry vehicles (MIRV) which had the capability to overburden
any missile defence system. However, ultimately the Soviet Union was not able to
continue the nuclear arms race and failed to bear the burden its defence budget put
on the economy (Sandler/Hartley 1999, p. xi).
3.2 Conversion
3.2.1 The End of the Cold War
While the end of the Soviet Union came rather surprisingly to contemporaries, the
inferior competitiveness of the Soviet economic system compared to Western cap-
italism became more and more obvious since the 1970s. It could be argued that
without the Reforms of the Gorbachev administration the Soviet Union would not
have collapsed – however Perestroika and Glasnost were no random or arbitrary de-
cisions made by Gorbachev. They expressed the necessity to cope with the fact that
the Soviet system was no longer capable of satisfying the needs of the population in
respect to economic performance or civil liberties.
The end of the Cold War marked the start of the discipline of economic conver-
28
sion – the shift from military to civilian usage of resources. The process of declining
necessity for military expenditures accelerated with the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe, and thus the disappearance of the most noteworthy “public en-
emy” as well as the emergence of governments friendly to the West in most of said
countries.
3.2.2 Peace Dividend
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and suc-
cessful arms reduction talks nourished expectations that reduced military budgets
will bring a substantial “peace dividend”. There are several ways the economy could
benefit from lower military expenditures: Most prominent among them is the fact
that a significant proportion of government spending can be used otherwise.
On expectations of the “peace dividend”, Klein (1997, p. 2) writes:
“People are impatient and want to be able to see immediate concrete
manifestation of the peace dividend in the form of more hospitals, cul-
tural facilities, educational establishments, technologically advanced in-
frastructure and other tangible evidence.”
and
“The dividend is already present and will, in due course, become much
larger.”
As Mintz/Stevenson (1995) argue, counting on a “peace dividend” implies the
assumption that military expenditures hinder economic development – a hypothesis
that is heavily contested in economic theory. They extend Ram’s (1986) model
of economic growth, which includes government spending, to distinguish between
military and non-military government expenditures.
Their empirical analysis suggests that military expenditures do not have a sig-
nificant influence on economic growth in most countries. However, increases in
non-military expenditures provide significantly better economic growth stimuli than
military expenditures. Although these results justify hopes on a “peace dividend”,
Mintz/Stevenson argue that the effects depend on how the saved money is spent
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and they will only materialize in the long run.
3.2.3 The Scale of Disarmament
Indeed disarmament after the Cold War freed a huge amount of resources. Global
military expenditures dropped from their all-time high of $ 1.36 trillion in 1987
to $ 864 billion in 1995 (U.S. ACDA 1996). This resembles a drop of 34%.
Likewise, between 1986 and 1999, procurement spending dropped by almost 50%
(Brzoska 2007, p. 1179).
The main factor of this sharp drop was the collapse of military spending in the
Soviet Union, which fell from $ 217 billion in 1987 to $ 18 billion in 1997 – an aston-
ishing drop by approximately 92% (BICC 2003). Former communist countries in
Eastern Europe also reduced their military budgets drastically. Unfortunately, the
breakdown of planned economy in former communist-governed countries caused con-
tractions of the economy at almost the same scale, leaving no savings from reduced
military spending (Brzoska 2007).
The EU member states reduced their military budgets by about 18%, while the
U.S. budget dropped by about 31% in the same time period (BICC 2003). One pos-
sible reason for the higher drop of military expenditures in the United States might
be the reluctance of European countries to participate in the last “hot” phase of the
Cold War following the failed “de´tente” at the end of the 80s. The predominant use
for these free resources was the reduction of public debt. Civil expenditures did by
far not rise by the same amount military expenditures shrank (Brzoska 2007).
3.2.4 Discussion of Effects
Brzoska (2007, p. 1205) writes that “expectations in the late 1980s and early 1990s
of a big peace dividend, or major economic push through the civilian use of military
technology proved illusory.” Former military assets were found to be of no particular
civilian use. Firms switching from military to civilian production were not compet-
itive, land previously owned by military bases could not be sold and the skills of
former soldiers were not in demand on the labour market. The positive long-term
effect of the “peace-dividend” never came. Instead of that, the world faced an eco-
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nomic downturn at the end of the 1990s, which also marked the end of the “decade
of disarmament”.
Another factor important to the success of conversion that Brzoska (2007) names
is the general performance of the economy. In the United States, where economic
growth was higher during the 90s than in Europe, conversion was more successful
than in Europe, because a faster growing civilian economy is rather capable to put
new capacities into use than a stagnating one.
However, there is evidence that the peace dividend had a little effect. Brzoska
(2007, p. 1991) lists several economic analyses which identify benefits from the re-
duction of military spending. According to them, the reduction of the public debt
spurred investment and about a fourth of the wealth gained in the United States
during the 1990s can be attributed to the ”peace dividend“. Germany, for example,
funded economic restructuring programs in the East from the money saved from
reduced military expenditures.
3.2.5 The End of the Cold War, Disarmament, Peace Dividend, and
Economic Theory
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent disarmament period provides a good
test for theories of demand of military expenditures. How well can these develop-
ments be modelled by the various theories?
The Neo-Classical Model
From the neo-classical point of view, the strategic environment drastically changed
with the adoption of Gorbachev’s new political stance towards the West. All of
a sudden, the danger of war virtually ceased to exist, and thus the same level of
security could be maintained with much less military spending. It could be argued
that it took some time to build trust, but besides that the neo-classical theory would
suggest a more or less instant drop of NATO military expenditures after the collapse
of the Soviet Union – not a slow, 14 year long decline.
Due to the fact that the neo-classical model assumes a trade-off between security
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and consumption, a “peace dividend” is self-evident in the neo-classical framework.
After a period of transition, resources previously devoted to generating security
would be used to increase consumption and welfare would rise.
The Arms Race
The arms race model describes changes in the enemy’s diplomatic stance towards
each other as parameter change. In the case of the end of the Cold War one might
argue that developments in the Soviet Union led to the Soviet citizen not being ready
to sustain a high military burden any more, thus their “fatigue” coefficient raised.
At the same time, leaders were willing to settle their issues in negotiations, thus
“grievance” was reduced. As an effect of these negotiations, the United States did
not consider the Soviet Union (later Russia) as an enemy, which reduced “reaction”.
The transition from an arms race to a phase of cooperation is expected to be smooth.
In this model, changes of the framework are necessary to portray disarmament.
Richardson (1960) expected the parameters of his model to stay the same over
time, a specification that has been rejected by those who further developed the arms
race model.
Models of Organisational Politics
Models of organizational Politics offer very little explanatory power regarding the
end of the Cold War and disarmament. They would attribute any change in be-
haviour to parameter changes, but fail to explain why they happened.
Marxist Underconsumption Theory
Since the underconsumption theory explains military expenditures mainly through
domestic economic developments, the end of the Cold War would not trigger dis-
armaments. According to this theory, disarmament happens particularly whenever
the general condition of the economy improves and it is easier for the monopolized
sectors to realize surplus. To some extent this is what happened after the Cold
War. With the introduction of capitalism in Eastern Europe, sizable new markets
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were opened up for investment, providing new investment possibilities. Since for
the markets to become attractive it is necessary to establish institutions favourable
to foreign investment, we would expect this to be a slow process. It is noteworthy
that the end of the “decade of disarmament” coincides with the crisis in the new
economy.
3.3 The New Geostrategic Environment
3.3.1 The Unipolar World
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States remained the only global
superpower. For defining the security of the Western World, this poses two central
issues. Firstly, the prime determinant of threat, i.e. Soviet military capacities, is
lackig. Hence, according to most theories, virtually no military would be needed
anymore.
The second result from the end of the bipolar system is the different international
security system that took form. Instead of a hostile power bloc, security issues
involve local ethnic wars, terrorism, and rogue states. In the bipolar world, the
superpowers were keen to keep their allies in line and, by channelling them in the
Cold War system, prevented several crises from escalating. Nowadays, in many of
these cases the concept of security cannot be adopted in the same way as during the
Cold War, because it is unclear what level of de-facto threat these challenges pose.
In such situations, the definition of the national interests has great impact on the
level of security. If the “national security” covers access to cheap raw materials and
foreign markets, this justifies wars even if no national assets are under the threat of
destruction.
McGuire (2006, p. 4) argues that, as the U.S. is unquestionable the unique world
power, “U.S. security, by default, has become inherently global”. Yet the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq show that this comes with increasing costs and uncertain re-
sults, revealing the problems the United States have enforcing their unipolar system.
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3.3.2 Revolution in Military Affairs
In the recent decades, technological improvements changed the way wars are fought.
This revolution in military affairs (RMA) consists mainly of new information tech-
nologies and precision targeting adopted in modern armies (Dunne/Coulomb 2008,
p. 9). A generation change like this has the potential of shifting the balance of power,
because powers who adopt the RMA enjoy a significant advantage over their enemies
who don’t.
The most important feature of the RMA is the explosion of costs in the defence
sector. Even the United States, which are responsible for about 47% of world-
wide defence expenditures, have problems affording newest generation equipment
such as the F-22 stealth fighter (Drew 07/21/2009). One solution to this issue is
out-sourcing of military tasks. By “importing private sector practices” (Dunne/
Coulomb 2008, p. 10), governments hope to reduce the costs of their military op-
erations. Currently, only the United States and, to a lesser extent, few European
countries and Russia were able to introduce newest generation weapons to their ar-
moury. This leads to the conclusion that future conflicts will be characterized by an
inequality of opposing forces – asymmetric conflicts.
Theory-wise, the neo-classical model is the only one even considering the relative
prices of military goods. However, the effect of the sum spent for defence depends
on the form of the utility function and thus cannot be generalized. All the other
theoretical models treat military expenditures either as economic factor or as a rep-
resentation of military capabilities and thus do not include considerations about unit
prices and would attribute such developments to a changing strategic environment.
3.3.3 Asymmetric Conflicts
While asymmetric conflicts are not new, the RMA suggests that it will be unlikely
that evenly equipped armies will face each other in the near future. The large
weapons stockpiles that the industrialized countries have amassed represent a com-
mitment to fight in a specific way – one, which challengers might be able to counter
with an unsuspected strategy. Omitoogun/Sko¨ns (2006) suggest that asymmet-
ric conflicts are why data on military expenditure become increasingly irrelevant
for determining security levels. In asymmetric conflicts, countries could face non-
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governmental enemies, whose military capabilities are not captured by any state’s
military expenditures. Also, the very nature of asymmetric conflicts could render
technological or quantitative superiority useless if the enemy successfully employs a
surprise tactic.
Asymmetric conflicts significantly raise the costs of military operations of the
“traditional” powers, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show. This is because
their answer to asymmetric conflicts is to improve the same efforts they already
undertake: to deploy more troops, to intensify attempts to crack down the enemy
trying to elude them. Another very costly alternative is trying to alter the social
basis of the enemy insurgency. Pacifying a country, i.e. creating incentives for people
not to get involved in insurrections, is a cost-intensive task that might add to the
tasks of military operations in the next decades (McGuire 2006).
3.3.4 Terrorism
Terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare that attracted a lot of attention since
the terrorist attacks concluded by Al Qaeda against the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. The “war on terror” was the key element in
U.S. military posture and involved the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001
and 2003, respectively. Since the conquest of these countries, the occupation army
has been contested by insurgencies. Since the “war on terror” was declared, several
other terrorist attacks or attempted terrorist attacks have caught the attention of
politics and media, making it the most prominent security issue.
Terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare that is characterized by the ability to
cause damage to superior enemies with little resources. For terrorists, the cost to
cause one dollar of damage is much lower than one dollar, while the cost to prevent
this damage is greater than one dollar (McGuire 2006, p. 632). This questions the
very concept of defense against terror attacks. Instead, anti-terror measures should
be entirely replaced by anti-terror insurances – however there might be political
incentives to react to terrorism.
Sandler/Hartley (1995, p. 324) describe two ways a country can react to the
threat of terrorist attacks. The passive option is to protect oneself using techno-
logical barriers and increased security at strategically important locations as well
as anti-terror laws and international cooperation in terror-prevention and improved
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counter-terrorist intelligence. The active strategy consists of preventive and retal-
iatory strikes as well as infiltration and covert operations directed against terrorist
cells. Of these measures, only preventive and retaliatory strikes are undertaken by
the military. Installing defensive technological barriers will raise the costs of the
operators, but will not alter military expenditures.
A sceptical point of view concerning the role of counter-terrorism is also sup-
ported by defence economic research. Summarizing empirical evidence from data
on frequency on terrorist incidents, Enders/Sandler (1993, p. 328-331) conclude
that defensive measures consisting of barriers or fortifications that protect certain
assets cause substitution, i.e. terrorists choose other, less fortified targets. Likewise,
retaliatory strikes only succeed in preventing further terrorist actions in rare cases
and can even lead to increased terrorist activity (Sandler/Hartley 1995, p. 330).
These findings are consistent with McGuire (2006): From an economic point of
view, counter-terrorist measures are ineffective, and states should not bother to
undertake them.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Hypotheses
4.1.1 Determinants of Military Expenditures in the Post Cold War
Era
Keeping in mind the recent developments in international relations and defence
economics helps identifying which factors are likely to play key roles in determining
levels of defence expenditures. With the End of the Cold War, threat levels in
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are bound to drop. Instead of arming against an
enemy alliance bloc, we observe an increase in importance of peace-keeping, crisis
intervention and nation-building (McGuire 2006). This most likely translates to
smaller, but better equipped armed forces (as long as no occupying force needs to
be maintained).
Rosh (1988) and Dunne/Perlo-Freeman (2003b) use the concept of the Se-
curity Web for an analysis of the demand of military expenditures in developing
countries. Developed countries, so their reasoning, are to a large degree included in
the web of alliances and so their military expenditures are much less likely to depend
on the military expenditures of the countries in their vicinity. Since with the end of
the Cold War, the military expenditures of those countries cannot be explained by
those of the opponent side in the Cold War, this leaves us with no apparent “threat”
value applicable to those nations. Hence, we lack a vital part for assessing how much
military force is deemed necessary. Consequently, recent panel data analyses have
omitted those countries that are responsible for the bulk of military expenditures.
Gadea/Pardos/Pe´rez-Fornie´s (2004) is the only exception known to me.
They use identical time series analysis methods to explain the military expenditures
of NATO countries between 1960 and 1999 by their income, spill-ins from allies and
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threat. Threat, however, is represented only by a set of dummy variables that reflect
“changes in the nature of the threat, or in the strategic doctrine of the Alliance.”
(Gadea/Pardos/Pe´rez-Fornie´s 2004, p. 234)
Given the lack of a clearly distinguished enemy block, it is no wonder that Omi-
toogun/Sko¨ns (2006) come to the conclusion that military expenditures play an
increasingly irrelevant role in determining threat. Thus the question emerges what
causes threat, and consequently makes military expenditures necessary, in the post
Cold War era.
4.1.2 The Trade-Instability Web
I suggest that the answer to this question is to be found in the nature of the missions
previously mentioned that the military forces of today’s NATO powers perform:
Intervention in crises, peace-keeping and nation building. Obviously, the necessary
strength of such an intervention force does not only depend on military expenditures
of potential enemies, since it will not be exclusively used against regular armies of
governments. If regional instability is what makes such missions necessary, political
stability (or the lack thereof) should be a good proxy for the necessity of performing
military interventions.
Furthermore it is necessary to investigate which countries’ political instability
developed nations are concerned about. Political activists and journalists regularly
accuse U.S. presidents of being deeply concerned about human rights in countries
where the leadership is hostile to the U.S. but caring little about human rights
situations in other nations. Obviously, (potential) vital trade partners and close
neighbours are much more important than other countries. This makes sense if
you take the military, or foreign policy in general, as a means to promote economic
policy, as the mercantilist and Marxist approach to international relations suggest.
The variable used to estimate the demand for military expenditures of developed
countries therefore consists of trade volume (imports plus exports) times instability
measures.
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4.1.3 Effects of Stagnation or Economic Downturn
The last two decades have been characterized by the rise of the “new economy”
as well as the largest recession since 1929. Developments characteristic for the
imperialistic phase of capitalism such as of capital concentration took place at a
large scale. This makes the recent period especially interesting for revisiting the
Marxist hypotheses that relate military expenditures with economic well-being. The
question that I will try to answer is: Are governments using military expenditures
to spur economic development?
Since the theory presented by Griffin/Wallace/Devine (1982) is specific to
the United States, it might not be applicable to every other country. However, in
nations with a strong military-industrial complex it might be possible that the same
relation between economic downturn and military expenditures are observable.
I will thus include measures of stagnation (i.e. falling profits) in the regression
equation, allowing for different reaction of every country by multiplying the stagna-
tion indicator with country-dummies and check if any of them are significant.
In a broader attempt to find relations between economic downturn and military
expenditures I will construct more general indicators of “stagnation” that do not
exclusively rely on the theory of Baran/Sweezy (1966) but rather resemble a
general approach of military Keynesianism. The construction of such indicators is
described in 4.2.5.
4.1.4 Publicity of the NATO Defence Good
Throughout its history, NATO was a defensive alliance relying on nuclear forces to
deter possible aggression directed against its members. Especially in the first years
of NATO, the United States’ nuclear arsenal was the backbone of the alliance.8
Oneal/Elrod (1989) argue that this was even the case after the adoption of the
flexible response strategy in the 1970s.
In essence, the task of the NATO was to produce an alliance-wide public good
8The fact that NATO acted purely defensively during the Cold War does not mean that its
member states did not resort to aggression in “solving” international crises or serving their
interests.
39
of defence, particularly aimed against the Warsaw Pact. The absence of official
NATO-wars during the Cold War is thus no indication of the uselessness of NATO
but could be interpreted as success. The scale of the success could be measured in
the measure of threat caused by the Warsaw pact that NATO neutralized.
In section 2.4.2 I described the proliferation of semi-public defence efforts within
NATO as a result of the spread of use of conventional military equipment. With the
dissolution of the communist bloc the question emerges if NATO still provides an
equivalent defence good. As described in 3.3.1, the nuclear arsenals’ deterrence po-
tential became increasingly redundant as the global strategic environment changed.
Do the NATO members still benefit from alliance membership?
Following the theory, the best way to answer this question, i.e. to determine the
effects of spill-ins from alliance members on the demand of military expenditures,
would be to regress military expenditures and check the coefficient of the sum of
allied military expenditures. If, as theory predicts, nations benefit from allied mil-
itary spending, their own and their allies’ expenditures are complements and the
coefficient should be negative, since a higher military expenditure of allies leads
ceteris paribus to a reduced need to arm. However, military expenditures of allies
are determined by threat as well as own military expenditures are, so a rise in mil-
itary expenditures of allies could also indicate an increase in threat not covered by
explanatory variables. Gadea/Pardos/Pe´rez-Fornie´s (2004) use the average
of NATO military spending as a proxy for threat. However, if I succeed in finding
explanatory variables that cover threat sufficiently, I should be able to read the true
effect of spill-ins from the respective coefficient.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Sample Size
My dataset contains data on 174 countries over up to 38 years. I have collected
or computed 138 variables that might affect military expenditures. The scale of
the dataset forced me to limit my analysis to a reduced number of countries. I
decided to investigate the determinants of military expenditures of those 40 countries
that spent the most money on their military program in the year 2008. These
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40 countries are responsible for about 95 % of the military expenditures in 2008
and for 96 % of all military expenditures between 1988 and 2008 as reported by
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2009). This selection
still includes countries such as Algeria, which is with 0.34 % of worldwide defence
outlays a “minor player” compared to the Great Powers. Since it is quite unlikely
that the determinants of military spending of countries the size of Malawi will allow
conclusions valid for powers such as the United States, the focus on the 40 largest
spenders will not debase the results.9 Since it is very likely that countries that are
not in the top 40 group will react different to determinants of military expenditure, it
is not possible to apply results obtained with the limited dataset to other countries.
However, for my subsample the results will be unbiased, and hence 96% of the rise
in worldwide military expenditures will be covered.
4.2.2 Military Expenditures
“Data on nominal military spending is itself suspect.”
This statement by Smith (1995, p. 78) reminds us that there are different defini-
tions and a lot of guessing behind the figures of military expenditures, as obtained
for example by SIPRI or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
Dishonest reporting, i.e. governments trying to disguise the true size of their mil-
itary program, are not the only issue, as even honest governments face different
situations. Conscript soldiers serve at a price lower than their true cost, pensions of
militaries are treated differently across nations, as well as paramilitary forces such
as the French Gendarmerie are. Military-related R & D and space programs are
other examples of expenses that could be reasonably argued to be included as well
as excluded from military expenditures.
The two main sources, SIPRI and ACDA, also have their own specific issues.
ACDA only reports military expenditures of the previous 11 years in their reports.
Since they revise their data, the various ACDA reports are rendered incompatible.
Dunne/Perlo-Freeman (2003a) argue that these revisions do not introduce a
systematic bias and thus only increase the “noise”, but especially when searching for
changing dynamics such incompatibilities between different versions of the ACDA’s
9The reduced dataset still contains data for more than said 40 countries because factors such as
the military expenditures of all countries neighbouring any of the top-40 spenders need to be
taken into account.
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reports are most likely problematic.
SIPRI is the most substantial database available, but it suffers from missing data.
While it is reasonable to leave out values for the Soviet Union in 1991 or Yugoslavia
during the Yugoslav War, since any number would be a well-educated guess at best,
I have argued in section 2.2 that even or especially values of estimated “enemy”
military expenditures are useful for constructing threat proxies. SIPRI and ACDA
define military expenditures of countries that do not follow NATO definitions dif-
ferently, thus replacing missing SIPRI values with ACDA data might cause a severe
bias, since the values of SIPRI and ACDA in some cases differ by a magnitude of
up to 10.10 Thus, I decided to deal with cases of missing data the same way I figure
decision makers would – by comparing the various estimates of SIPRI and ACDA of
the previous years’ defence burdens and assuming an equal share of GDP is spent
on the military in the following year.11
Another issue with military expenditure data is demonstrated by the case of the
1975 re-evaluation of Soviet productivity by the CIA:
“The CIA calculated Soviet military spending by first estimating the
number of goods and services purchased – number of troops, tanks, ships,
soldiers etc. – from intelligence sources. It then estimated what these
would have cost the USA to get a dollar figure. This was then multiplied
by an estimated rouble/dollar exchange rate, to get a rouble figure, which
could then be expressed as a share of CIA estimates of Soviet GDP. In
1975, the CIA decided that the Soviet military industry was much less
efficient than previously thought and altered the exchange rate to reflect
this, raising the estimated share of military expenditure from 6-8% to
11-13%. Although this did not change their estimate of Soviet forces
or the dollar figure for Soviet military expenditure, the revision to the
estimated Soviet share of military expenditure was widely interpreted in
the US as indicating an increased Soviet threat” (Dunne/Smith 2007,
p. 919).
10Note that the fixed effects estimator will only consider deviations from the mean of variables,
thus the level of defence expenditures is irrelevant as long as the variations follow the same
pattern and one country’s military expenditures aren’t exaggerated in respect to other countries
in the same category (e.g. potential enemies).
11Note that imputations of data were only done for those countries that are not the top 40 military
spenders but whose military expenditures contribute to the threat assessment of those countries
in the focus of the analysis.
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The complex relation of the military’s tasks could without doubt be better mod-
elled if data on weapon stocks and disaggregated data on military expenditures were
available. Different equipment could be identified to serve a different purpose, and
it would be clear how much of the arms stock would be rendered obsolete if the
strategic environment or defence technology changed. This however is not the case,
especially not when the focus includes several countries over time. This is most un-
fortunate, since several peace research institutes claim that many Western European
nations are building up arms although their defence burdens do not grow.12 This
might be due to the fact that the expansion of NATO and European Union made
less territorial defence efforts necessary, so that a build-up of intervention-oriented
forces does not increase the military budget.
4.2.3 Security Web and (Potential) Enemies
Following Rosh’s (1988) hypothesis that military expenditures will be influenced by
the military expenditures of neighbours and Dunne/Coulomb (2008), who argue
that potential or current enemies’ military spending could have a larger effect, I
constructed a set of security web and (potential) enemies for every nation in the
top 40 group. I took the tables that Rosh (1988) and Dunne/Perlo-Freeman
(2003a) attached to their papers as a basis and expanded them, added conflicts
that sparked after 1997 (the last year of the dataset provided by Dunne/Perlo-
Freeman 2003a) for the respective years, removed conflicts that were resolved after
1997 and in few cases altered classifications in cases where it seemed justified to me.
Luckily, the number of conflicts of the top 40 countries is limited and patterns are
identical in many cases (e.g. NATO).
The case of NATO countries’ potential enemies deserves special attention, since
this group is responsible for the bulk of worldwide military expenditures and were
excluded from panel data analysis of military expenditures in previous studies. After
the Cold War, most NATO countries were involved in four wars: The 1991 Gulf
War against Iraq, the 1999 Kosovo War against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(including previous military incidents involving action against Serbian forces in the
Yugoslav Wars), the 2001 occupation of Afghanistan and the 2003 occupation of
Iraq. Therefore, Iraq is considered a potential enemy in 1990 and 1991 and an
enemy in 1991, then again a potential enemy until 2003 and an enemy in 2003 for
12For example, Von Boemcken (2009) claims that the equipment-related military expenditures
have increased by 25% from 2007 to 2008.
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all countries that participated in the 2003 invasion. Yugoslavia is a potential enemy
of NATO members from 1993 to 1999 and an enemy in 1999. Since the military
of Afghanistan was toppled with little direct military involvement of NATO states
other than the USA, Afghanistan is only an enemy nation of the United States in
2001. The “cost” of the occupation operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are proxied
by the battle deaths variable instead of Afghan or Iraqi military spending, as the
official governments of those nations supported the occupations.
Furthermore, NATO as a whole is periodically engaged in attempts to counter
Russian or Chinese influence. In a way, Russia and China could be regarded as the
“security web” of the NATO alliance, as they are the only two non-allied countries
with a military capable of projecting a sizeable amount of power outside their own
territory. The question whether Russia and NATO are allies or rivals still seems to be
unanswered.13 Thus, I have constructed alternative versions of potential enemy lists
that include/exclude Russia and China in order to check whether NATO countries
react to Russian/Chinese military spending (and vice versa) or not.
4.2.4 Conflict Intensity
Obviously, nations currently engaged in conflicts will have higher military expendi-
tures. After all, if there is an ongoing conflict, the military fulfils an expensive task,
which is not necessary in countries that are currently at peace, and might be even
deemed unnecessary (thus not being prepared) by governments of peaceful nations.
Some empirical studies (e.g. Dunne/Perlo-Freeman 2003a) have addressed
this issue by introduction of an “at war” dummy to models of military expenditure.
However, a binary dummy variable treats all wars the same, whether it is a total war
in which both sides commit all their resources to the war effort or a minor campaign
such as the Falklands War. Therefore, the use of battle deaths is a more appropriate
method of identifying the commitment of a nation to a war.
Another possibility is to use the total number of casualties in a conflict or the
number of allied casualties as a proxy. This would constitute an alternative measure
13“Russia cannot be treated both as a NATO ally and as an enemy, France’s president, Nicolas
Sarkozy said this week [Feb 11th]. Yet that is how Russia seems to see things. Its new mili-
tary doctrine paints NATO, and particularly its enlargement, as the biggest threat to Russia.”
(Economist 2/13/2010)
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Figure 4.1: Number of Conflicts and Conflict Casualties14
of conflict intensity independent of the number of nationals of a certain country died
in a given year.
4.2.5 Economic Variables
The economic well-being is a key factor for the demand for military expenditures
according to most theories. Only the Richardson arms race and the bureaucratic
models, which explain military expenditures by enemy or past values of military
expenditures, do not consider the economy. The most important economic variable,
the gross domestic product (GDP), does not only serve as an indicator of a country’s
wealth, it also quantifies the country’s possibility to devote resources to the military.
In the neo-classical security vs. consumption trade-off model, GDP influences
military expenditures in three ways. Firstly, a higher GDP eases resource constraints
and allows for more military expenditures. Secondly, a higher GDP means that
there is more wealth that needs protection, thus increasing the need for military
expenditures. Thirdly, through economy of scale and public good effects, once GDP
is high enough, a lower percentage of it could be enough to guarantee security from
14Source: Marshall (2005)
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threats.
In the Marxist underconsumptionist models, indicators of stagnation play a vi-
tal role in determining military expenditures. Issues on identifying stagnation have
been discussed in 2.6.4. Unfortunately, sector-specific measures for profit are diffi-
cult to obtain. Eurostat (2009) reports sector-specific gross operating surplus for
EU countries between 1995 and 2007, although data is missing for many country-
year combinations. This might indicate stagnation as well as the “profits” used by
Griffin/Wallace/Devine (1982), so I will investigate if gross operating surplus
has effects on military expenditures in EU countries.
However, since the mercantilist / Marxist approach to international relations also
argues that any kind of economic downturn could lead to increased international
tension due to harsher competition, other indicators of economic downturn could
lead to increased military spending. For the purpose of this study, I will use the
difference between current and past ten years average economic growth as alternative
indicator for economic downturn.
4.2.6 Trade-Instability Web
Using dyadic yearly trade data (Barbieri/Keshk/Pollins 2008) I have con-
structed several alternative versions of the “trade-instability web”. The variable in
essence consists of a weighted average of either Marshall’s (2005) “civtot”15, “ac-
tot”16 or World Bank’s ”political stability and absence of political violence” (PV)17
governance indicator (linear rescaled to 0-14 in order to improve comparability with
the MEPV indicators) of all trade partners.
The weights consist either of the value of the trade between two nations (trade),√
trade or log trade.
In an alternative way of constructing the trade-instability web inspired by mer-
cantilist theory of international relations, nations only consider instability within
15This is the sum of ethnic violence, ethnic warfare, civil violence and civil warfare within a
country, all of which score between 0 and 10.
16This represents the sum of “civtot” plus international violence and international warfare (within
the country’s borders).
17This represents estimates of the likelihood that the government will be overthrown by political
violence.
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countries whose GDP is half theirs or less as possible and thus only take increased
instability in those countries as reason to arm (“hypothesis 2” as opposed to “hy-
pothesis 1”). To illustrate this point, let us consider Algeria, which will probably not
consider arming itself to battle instability in, say, Great Britain, but might consider
intervening in the inner affairs of its African trade partners.
4.2.7 Dummies
A series of dummies was created to describe a country’s membership in NATO or
Warsaw pact and to classify them in three distinct income groups sorted by average
GDP per capita over the time period. Another set of dummy variables captures
effects of the Cold War era, the period of disarmament and recent years.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Panel Estimation
The use of panel estimation methods is fairly new in defence economics. Previ-
ous studies have focussed on explaining the defence budget of a single country
or employed cross-section analysis. However, both methods imply specific issues.
Whenever cross-country data is used, country-specific factors will distort the result.
Examples of country-specific factors include the border length-land area ratio and
institutional characteristics or spending habits. On the other hand, time series anal-
ysis is likely to produce results that are only applicable to one country. If the correct
methods are employed, panel data analysis is a mighty tool, since it can distinguish
between within-country and between-country differences.
Let us first consider the various estimation methods that can be applied to panel
data:
Pooled Regression
This method treats all observations from all countries and years the same:
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Mi,t = α + βXi,t + ui,t (4.1)
where α is the intercept and β the vector of regression coefficients.
In pooled regressions, the time and group dimensions are ignored and within- and
between-difference are treated the same, thus all coefficients are the same. This is
the correct approach if no individual slopes or intercepts are to be expected. In this
case the only advantage that comes with panel data is the increased sample size.
Within / One-Way Fixed Effects Estimator
The “within” or one way fixed effects (FE) estimator allows for country-specific
intercepts while keeping slope coefficients equal for all countries and years. The
regression equation thus changes to
Mi,t = αi + βXi,t + ui,t (4.2)
This regression method only takes differences over time within a country into ac-
count by comparing the values of dependent and independent variables with their
time mean. Thus the coefficients are free from differences across individual countries
and instead describe how changes over time in single countries affect military ex-
penditures, assuming the same coefficient for all countries. Note that this approach
is identical to replacing the intercept of the pooled regression with country-specific
dummy variables.
Between Estimator
Contrary to the within-estimator, the “between” estimator only takes differences
between countries into account. It does so by constructing the time-average of
dependent and independent variables (thus eliminating the time dimension) and
uses them in a regression similar to the pooled one:
48
Mi = α + βXi + ui (4.3)
Random Effects Estimator
The merit of the random effects estimator is that it allows coefficients to differ over
countries. The regression equation takes the form
Mi,t = αi + βiXi,t + ui,t (4.4)
This could, if no further restraints were given, represent a system where the
equation Mt = α+ βXt + ut is solved for each country independently. However, the
random effects estimator assumes that effects are identical distributed and bases its
weight of within and between variance on that assumption.
4.3.2 Bias and Heterogeneity issues
Choice of Estimator
The question which estimator to use depends on the data source and the questions
the model is designed to answer. If all data was generated by the same random
process, then all estimators would yield the same results. However, if there is het-
erogeneity within the data, the between estimator and the within estimator measure
something different.
To illustrate that point, let us calculate a simple regression of military expendi-
tures as reported in U.S. ACDA (2000) on GDP and a constant. The results are
presented in table 4.1.
The between-estimator calculates averages over time of each country and then
compares those values globally. The results confirm the trivial hypothesis that
countries with a higher GDP spend more money on their military than others do.
The coefficient of 0.046 suggests that defence is a normal good. Dunne/Perlo-
Freeman (2003a) use two between estimations to compare the coefficients of de-
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Table 4.1: Between and Within Effects Estimator
Comparison
dependent variable: military expenditure
between effects within effects
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio
const. −30.407 −0.02 10486.1*** 28.43
GDP 0.046*** 17.38 −0.008*** −4.93
*** significant at 1% level
mand for military expenditure in developing countries during and after the Cold
War.
The within-estimator investigates which effects changes in explanatory variables
have on military expenditures. Since the sample time period was characterized
by both falling military expenditures and raising GDP in most countries, GDP is
calculated as having a negative effect on military expenditures. This is obviously a
misleading result due to the fact that important variables such as threat perception
were omitted.
The random effects model uses information from both the within and between
differences and would thus be regarded the best choice. Unfortunately, its strong
assumptions cause significant bias if the effects are correlated with the explanatory
variables – which is likely to occur in the case of military expenditures.
Heterogeneity
The countries of the world vastly differ in all categories used in this empirical analy-
sis. It is thus most likely that this heterogeneity in variables also causes heterogeneity
in coefficients. Regression coefficients will still report average effects, however the
explanatory power of models could suffer. Dunne/Smith (2007) suggest calculating
individual regressions in order to test the heterogeneity assumption. Wise choice of
subgroups may help to limit heterogeneity while still keeping sample size high and
ensuring clarity.
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One obvious choice for grouping countries is their income. As mentioned be-
fore, most panel data studies of military expenditures have focussed on developing
countries, so including developed countries to the sample is bound to introduce het-
erogeneity. Alliance membership is a criterion whose effects on other coefficients will
also be of paramount interest.
Dynamic Panel Bias
In regression equations that include a lagged dependent variable another bias occurs.
Firstly, if the number of periods is small, the coefficient of the dependent variable
will be biased downwards (Dunne/Smith 2007). There are various methods to
correct for this bias. Buddelmeyer et al. (2008) use Monte Carlo simulations to
compare the bias of various estimators and come to the conclusion, that Arellano/
Bond’s (1991) General Method of Moments, Kiviet’s (1995) least squares dummy
variables corrected and Anderson/Hsiao’s (1982) instrumental variables estimator
all provide decent estimates. Their mean absolute bias is around 0.005 if T = 10,
thus it is reasonable to treat results and t-statistics as being accurate. Only in the
case of small N and T and a high coefficient of the lagged dependent variable the
standard OLS estimator outperforms them with a mean absolute bias of still quite
acceptable 0.059.
4.3.3 Model Specification
Several issues have to be considered when deciding on the exact form of the regres-
sion estimation. First, the dependent variable can be expressed in terms of absolute
values of military expenditures or in form of the defence burden, the military ex-
penditures per GDP. The same applies to the various threat variables. Rosh 1988
uses the average of the military burden of neighbouring countries. The example of
China and India, to which the military burdens of Bhutan and Nepal probably have
little effect demonstrate that this value has to be weighted with GDP or population.
Another issue is whether or not to apply a logarithmic transformation to the re-
gression equation. Dunne/Perlo-Freeman (2003b) use a logarithmic form since
it provides better results. This specification implies that the effect of variables is
not additive, but an increase in one variable will lead to a certain percent increase in
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military expenditures. This approach is in line with the idea of the military serving
several purposes as the same time, since in a logarithmic specification the absolute
increase caused by the increase of one explanatory variable depends on the levels of
the other explanatory variables, e.g. the size of the effect of an increase in a threat
variable will depend on levels of the economic variables.
4.4 Results and Diagnosis
4.4.1 Determinants of Military Expenditures
The first task was to construct a working model that explains military expenditures
which can be later extended to test the other hypotheses formulated above. Fol-
lowing previous research, the basic determinants of military expenditures that were
considered are GDP, population, military expenditures of the security-web coun-
tries, potential and actual enemies, dummies for the Cold War period, the decade
of disarmament and the recent years – this dummy was named “crisis intervention”
since the end of the decade of disarmament coincided with the formulation of that
NATO doctrine.
I tested linear, log-linear and log-log specifications, of those the log-log specifi-
cations yielded the best results. This is in accordance with previous studies and
theoretical considerations of the functional form of determinants of defence spend-
ing. One very interesting result is that population is insignificant in all specifications.
This contradicts some previous results (e.g. Dunne/Perlo-Freeman 2003b), but
there are two possible explanations. Firstly, in fixed effects panel studies, it is un-
likely that major changes of population size occur that could exercise a significant
effect on military expenditures. In fact, Germany and Russia are the only excep-
tions. Also, especially in the largest military powers it is unlikely that there are still
improvements to be gained from economics of scale.
Using logarithms of military expenditures and logarithms of defence burdens
yielded similar results concerning significance of coefficients, however specifications
for lme exhibited significantly higher values of R2.
The basic model of determinants of military expenditures is presented in table
4.2.
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Table 4.2: Basic Determinants of Military
Expenditures
dependent variable: loga military expenditure;
40 groups, 840 observations, avg. obs. per group: 21.0
coefficient t-ratio
const. 4.004*** 17.54
log GDP 0.847*** 22.14
log pe1 meb 0.020*** 5.91
log e mec 0.017*** 4.99
disarmd −0.018 −1.00
R-squared (within) 0.45
*** significant at 1% level
a In order to increase interpretability and deal with
missing or zero values, logx was always calculated
as ln(1 + x)
b Potential enemy’s military expenditures
c Enemy’s military expenditures (cumulative)
d “Decade of Disarmament“ (1990-1999) dummy
variable
4.4.2 Serial Correlation
In order to check for misspecification, I calculated the Durbin-Watson statistic in
Eviews7. The value of 0.30 suggests that there is serial autocorrelation in the model.
Likewise, the test for serial correlation for Stata developed by Drukker (2003)
rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. This is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that standard operation procedures are not evaluated in a yearly basis and
decisions are delegated to the bureaucracy in the meantime, resulting in a propor-
tional increase of the defence budget over time.
One way to solve this problem is to use a dynamic panel estimation technique.
Therefore, the Arellano-Bond two-step estimation was calculated in Eviews7. Re-
sults are displayed in table 4.3.
The coefficient of 0.75 suggests that the defence budget depends to a large extent
on the last year’s budget. However, in a purely incrementalist model we would ex-
pect this coefficient to be closer to (or even greater than) one. The other coefficients
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Table 4.3: Dynamic Panel Estimation
dependent variable: log military expenditure;
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation;
40 groups, 760 observations, avg. obs. per group: 19.0
coefficient t-ratio
log met−1 0.7523*** 218.37
log GDP 0.1053*** 14.99
log pe1 mea 0.024*** 6.36
log e meb 0.015*** 2.67
disarmc −0.038*** −19.23
*** significant at 1% level
and standard errors follow the same overall pattern, with the exception of the dis-
armament period dummy being significant in the dynamic model, which is plausible
since the essence of the ”decade of disarmament“ was that the military budgets were
smaller than in the years before, not necessarily that defence budgets were smaller,
since they were in fact quite high at the beginning of the ”decade of disarmament“.
Also, the coefficient of GDP is a bit greater. Still, it is safe to assume that the static
model captures roughly the same effects as the dynamic one.
However, as I argued in chapter 2.5.4, even though previous values of dependent
variables might constitute fitting explanatory variables, the task is to find models
that do without them. Thus, I will try to find acceptable specifications that do not
include lagged dependent variables.
4.4.3 Heteroskedasticity
Using the module xttest3 provided by Baum (2000) I tested the specified regression
for heteroskedasticity. The test rejects the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity
with high significance. This was to be expected, since heteroskedasticity is likely to
occur as countries greatly differ in size.
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are likely to occur in all subsequent re-
gression, thus I will use Stata’s clustered sandwich estimator for computing standard
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errors, which provides robust result in the case of serial correlation and heteroskedas-
ticity (Hoechle 2007).
4.4.4 Group Heterogeneity
The NATO alliance
Although the R-squared of the “basic” regression is quite high, it is possible that
systematic heterogeneity exists in the sample. The most obvious candidate for a
distinct subgroup is the NATO alliance, since it contains both the richest and the
largest spender countries. To test whether those countries behave different than
the rest of the top 40, I performed separate regressions for NATO and non-NATO
countries.
Table 4.4: Test for Group Heterogeneity: NATO members
dependent variable: log military expenditure;
40 groups, 840 observations, avg. obs. per group: 21.0
NATO members other countries
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio
const. 7.080*** 9.88 3.953*** 6.76
log GDP 0.380*** 3.58 0.846*** 8.21
lop pe1 me 0.012** 2.17 0.018 1.64
log e me 0.005* 1.82 0.053** 2.56
disarmb −0.0353 −1.45 −0.044 −1.41
R-squared (within) 0.15 0.51
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
b “Decade of Disarmament” (1990-1999) dummy variable
The results, presented in table 4.4, are very intriguing. First of all, the hypothesis
that all coefficients are jointly equal to their counterparts is rejected with high
significance (data not presented), thus the hypothesis that NATO members behave
differently than non-members is confirmed.
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Secondly, the effect of log GDP is much greater for non-NATO countries than for
NATO allies. A hypothesis test on coefficient equality is rejected at 1% significance
level. It seems NATO’s military power has reached a level where more capacities
are not always useful and the military budget is thus not automatically increased
when possibilities to do so are given as GDP rises. The low R-squared for the NATO
model suggests that there are important explanatory variables missing.
Although the distinction between potential and de-facto enemies is only significant
at a 10% level in the NATO model and not at all significant in the non-NATO
model18, the reaction to “enemy” military spending is found to be significantly
higher in non-NATO countries.
The period of disarmament dummy, which is insignificant in both specifications,
will be omitted in further analysis.
Income Groups
The 40 largest spenders of military expenditures include rich countries such as
Switzerland as well as poor ones such as India or Syria. These countries exhibit
vastly different domestic situations, thus it is likely that the military fulfils different
functions and thus the determinants of military expenditures are different. I have
therefore divided the sample into three groups distinct by the time-average of GDP
per capita. 13 African, Asian and South American countries form the poorest group
of nations with an average income per capita of less than 5 000 USD over the time
period. The middle group, ranging from 5 000 to 20 000 USD consists of 10 “thresh-
old countries” in Europe, Asia and America. The richest group is with 17 countries
the largest one and consists of the “First World” plus Kuwait and Singapore.
Table 4.5 indicates that, while groups 1 and 3 differ significantly, the ”basic“
equation does not seem fit to explain group 2 ’s military expenditures. Group 2
consists of countries with completely different strategic and economic environments
that changed rapidly during the observed time frame, which might explain the poor
performance. Furthermore, all coefficients of group 3 are significantly different from
those of group 1.
18This should not disturb us, since de-facto enemies are also potential enemies, and once de-facto
enemies are dropped from the estimation equation the coefficient of potential enemies rises in
size and significance.
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Table 4.5: Test for Group Heterogeneity: GDP per capita
dependent variable: log military expenditure;
40 groups, 840 observations, avg. obs. per group: 21.0
group 1 group 2 group 3
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio
const. 2.246*** 3.66 5.944*** 6.69 6.906*** 3.54
log GDP 1.106*** 8.54 0.544*** 3.36 0.397 1.35
lop pe1 me 0.045** 2.81 −0.008 −0.56 0.009 1.19
log e me 0.033 1.18 −0.001 −0.06 0.013*** 5.97
R-squared (within) 0.63 0.50 0.15
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
Although log GDP ’s coefficient of 1.106 indicates that defence might be a luxury
good for poor nations, the coefficient is not significantly greater than 1, thus the
data does not back that claim. The between-group comparison shows that the
effect of GDP on military expenditures drops drastically the higher the income is.
The insignificant (significant yet low in some other specifications including more
sophisticated threat variables) coefficient of GDP in the richest countries’ group
contradicts the hypothesis that military spending has reached a “natural low”. This
number suggests that, if it were not for the threat variables, military expenditures
would grow at a much slower rate than GDP and the defence burden would decrease.
Security Web and (Potential) Enemies
The security web, which is only defined for countries which were not members of ei-
ther NATO or Warsaw pact in the time frame investigated, has no significant effect
on military expenditures in the basic model or in specifications including politi-
cal/economic variables. For non-aligned countries, the security web is defined as the
military expenditures, or the (weighted) average of defence burden, of neighbouring
countries and nations that are capable of influencing the security situation of a coun-
try, e.g. sea neighbours or regional powers. Thus, the question of which countries
to include in a given country’s security web is independent of time and strategic or
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diplomatic considerations, hence more or less obvious and not suspicious of suffering
from poor judgement. An insignificant coefficient of security web military spending
indicates that the top 40 spenders have a large enough military force that makes
reaction to non-hostile neighbours’ military build-up unnecessary.
The coefficient of enemies’ military spending was significant only in some speci-
fications. This is in line with current research and indicates that countries do not
necessarily react to their current enemy’s military spending more than to their po-
tential enemies’, perhaps because it is difficult for decision makers to distinguish
between these groups in advance.
Also noteworthy is the fact that for NATO countries, the distinction between
“enemy” and “potential enemy” is only significant at a 10% confidence interval (see
table 4.4). This is not surprising given the fact that the enemies NATO faced during
the investigated time period were – with the exception of the Soviet Union – utterly
minor powers when compared to NATO’s military power. The fact that non-NATO
countries react much more intensively to enemies’ military spending indicates that
those nations do to a lesser degree maintain just-in-case military capacities and
are thus forced to arm once they acquire enemies. Note that the comparatively
high coefficient of 0.053 changes to 0.017 if the Warsaw Pact countries are omitted.
Unfortunately, the small number of observations for Warsaw Pact countries makes
a separate analysis of this alliance impossible.
4.4.5 Political Indicators and the Trade-Insecurity Web
In order to test the “liberal peace” hypothesis of lower military expenditures in
democratic countries (e.g. Rosh 1988) I have added several political indicators to
the regression equation. Unfortunately, results were insignificant in most cases after
standard errors were corrected. World Bank’s governance indicator PV (political
stability and absence of violence) as well as the democracy and autocracy scores are
not significant in any specification. This fails to confirm the “liberal hypothesis” of
lower military expenditures in more peaceful countries. However, we have to keep in
mind that our sample only includes the top 40 military spenders. Those countries
chose to maintain a large military force for some reason, and it is possible that this
makes reaction to changing scores of democracy etc. unnecessary, since the mili-
tary is powerful enough to deal with domestic problems anyway. Besides, due to
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the specification of the fixed effects estimator, only changes of the explanatory vari-
able during the investigated time period influence military expenditures, while the
“liberal hypothesis” states that less democratic countries maintain a larger military
than autocratic ones.
The total major episodes of politically motivated violence (MEPV) index by Mar-
shall (2005) has a significant influence on military expenditures, however only for
the richest group of countries. In this group there are only three countries actu-
ally faced with politically motivated violence: Kuwait during the Second Gulf War,
UK’s Northern Ireland conflict and international terrorism and wars for the United
States in 2001 and 2003/04 respectively. Same is true for income group 2, where
civil plus ethnic warfare/violence is significant due to such conflicts in Mexico and
Saudi Arabia.
The Trade-Instability Web
I have constructed various variables to test the trade-instability web hypothesis that
I formulated in section 4.1.2. Depending on the specification and the included coun-
tries, some of the measures are significant. Fortunately, there is a pattern. First
of all, countries react most strongly to rises of total political violence and warfare
(actot) in their trade partners compared to civil plus ethnic violence and warfare
only (civtot) or World Bank’s PV governance indicator. For the richest group of
countries, “hypothesis 1” as well as “hypothesis 2” (see section 4.1.2) can be con-
firmed with high significance. In a regression containing both variables, “hypothesis
2” has a significant coefficient and “hypothesis 1” is insignificant, thus “hypothesis
2” performs slightly better. The choice of weights (trade volume, sqr(trade volume)
or log(trade volume)) had little effect on the significance of the trade-instability web
coefficient, with sqr(trade) producing slightly better results in most cases. Table 4.6
reports the results.
This model is, with an R-squared of 0.56, so far the best explanation of military
expenditures for the group of rich countries. Since there is enough variation in the
trade-security web variable, it can be concluded that rich military powers do react
to increasing instability in their trading partners. All in all, the trade-instability
web seems to be a valid concept for a country’s involvement in instable regions.
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Table 4.6: The Trade-Instability Web
dependent variable: log military expenditure;
17 countries, 284 observations, avg. obs. per group: 16.7
coefficient t-ratio
const 7.800*** 6.24
log GDP 0.248 1.30
lop pe1 me 0.002 0.49
log e me 0.006 4.16***
actot 0.116 3.43***
tsw h2 actot sqrtradea 0.149 4.33***
R-squared (within) 0.56
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
a MEPV’s total political violence score of a nation’s
trade partner’s whose GDP is half theirs or less,
weighted by square-root of total trade volume
4.4.6 The Role of NATO
In order to check for the benefits of the NATO military alliance I have computed
a series of regressions which yielded ambiguous results. Following the procedure
derived from the theory, I regressed military expenditures of NATO countries on
spill-in from alliance members. The extension of the basic regression however yields
a positive coefficient on the log spillin variable, indicating that it captures alliance-
wide security effects. This changed when I switched to the potential enemies version
which included potential hostilities between NATO and Russia plus China19 and
corrected for another commitment indicator: battle-related casualties. Casualties
are insignificant for all but the richest group of countries and were thus not included
in previous regressions.
Comparisons also showed that the determinants of military expenditures of the
NATO allies varied over time (see table 4.7). Since considerable variation of the
19Since here data was used first to determine the correct specification of the potential enemies list
and then again to compute coefficients, caution is advised when drawing conclusions concerning
the relationship between NATO and the other security council members. The purpose here is
to demonstrate that, once enough possible alliance-wide security effects are reflected in other
explanatory variables, spillin has a negative sign.
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explanatory variables is guaranteed even in the shorter time period of “crisis inter-
vention” this split of the sample seemed possible. During the “decade of disarma-
ment”, the version of potential enemies without Russia and China performs better
than the extended version. Also, battle deaths are barely significant at 10% level in
the model covering the whole time period, insignificant for the decade of disarma-
ment and significant at 5% level in the later time period. However, after the turn of
the millennium battle deaths and the adapted version of the potential enemies are
highly significant. Enemies’ military spending was insignificant in both periods and
was thus omitted.
The results suggest that the NATO alliance is, since the beginning of the 21st
century, sensitive to the military expenditures of the remaining Great Powers Russia
and China, which could be argued to constitute the “security web” of the NATO.
This does not necessarily indicate hostility but could reflect the wish of NATO to
remain the most powerful military bloc. Another result that is in line with alliance
theory is that during the decade of disarmament the public good produced by NATO
lost its use. With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO allies recommenced
profiting directly from allied military expenditure, most likely by substituting own
with allied deployments in crisis regions. The significance of the casualty variable
shows that this is a valid proxy for commitment in military operations.
4.4.7 Economic Indicators
In order to test the effect of economic variables such as GDP growth or various
stagnation indicators, I added those measures to the regression equation. None of
the possible stagnation indicators (total surplus in monopolized sectors, change of
total surplus in monopolized sectors, deviation from past ten year average GDP
growth) was significant in any specification, including those leaving out the above
political variables.
However, once again a disaggregation of the data revealed an intriguing pattern.
Although the full sample of countries for which sector-specific surplus data was
obtained from Eurostat (2009) showed no significance, considering only the five
largest EU-economies United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, log total
surplus turns significant and renders the other variables insignificant. Results are
presented in table 4.8.
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Table 4.7: The Role of the NATO Alliance
dependent variable: log military expenditure;
disarm crisis
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio
const. 7.139 2.16** 11.715 10.87***
log GDP 0.306 1.72* 0.262 1.76*
log pe3 me 0.067 3.45*** 0.200 2.89***
log casa 0.006 0.49 0.036 4.88***
log spillinb −0.014 −0.07 −0.442 −3.52***
# of obs. (countries) 141 (15)c 135 (15)
R-squared (within) 0.20 0.39
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
a Battle-related deaths as reported by Uppsala University (2009)
b Sum of allied military expenditures
c Poland joined NATO in 1999
Although these results are not sufficient to prove Baran/Sweezy’s (1966) hy-
pothesis, especially because the sample size is very small and a significant correlation
does not prove all of the underlying assumptions, a negative correlation between
monopoly profits and military expenditures in the largest EU-economies is interest-
ing. Also noteworthy is the coefficient of GDP growth, which is insignificant in the
full sample. For income group 1, the poorest countries, it is positive and significant
at 10% level in some specifications (those controlling for political violence) but for
income group 3, the richest countries, it is negative and significant.
There are two possible interpretations of these results. Firstly, for poorer countried
GDP growth might mean more capacities for government spending und thus lead
to a higher defence budget, while in richer countries military expenditures could be
used to counter economic downturn, in the five largest EU economies represented
by profits in the monopolized sector. This could for example be done by adjusting
the timing of planned arms projects. Secondly, military expenditures could be seen
as helping economic growth in poorer countries and hindering it in the advaned
capitalist countries, resulting in a negative correlation between military expenditures
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Table 4.8: Economic Determinants of Military Expenditures
dependent variable: log military expenditure;
model 1 model 2
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio
const. 6.578*** 12.18 7.029*** 4.10
log GDP 0.716*** 6.70 0.385 1.49
lop pe1 me −0.003 −0.80 0.008 1.17
log e me 0.004 0.91 0.014*** 6.09
log total surplusa −0.141* −2.40
GDP growth rate −0.016*** −9.02
# of obs. (countries) 59 (5)b 357 (17)c
R-squared (within) 0.55 0.23
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
a Log of total surplus generated in the monopolized sectors of the economy,
obtained from Eurostat (2009).
b Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom
c The 17 largest military spenders with GDP per capita > 20 000 USD
and economic well-being. In any case the coefficient of -0.016 indicates a rather weak
correlation between military expenditures and the GDP growth rate.
4.4.8 Terrorism, Battle-Related Casualties and other Global
Indicators
Finally let us consider the effects of terrorism and other global indicators on mili-
tary expenditures. I have regressed military expenditures on the number of terror
bombings or the number of victims respectively. Other global indicators include
the number of wars listed in the Uppsala University (2009) conflict dataset, the
number of victims in local or global civil wars, the number of national, allied or
total casualties of conflicts that nation is active in.
Of those indicators, only the number of conflicts and the global actot score,
weighted by population, were significant. Income-group specific analysis reveals
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that global indicators are more significant for richer countries and insignificant for
the poorest group.
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5 Conclusions
The decade of disarmament ended around the millennium and military expenditures
are on the rise again since then. Since there are no open hostilities between the great
powers this is impossible to explain in the context of the Cold War understanding
of arm races. However, several significant developments have altered the strategic
environment. The gain of security via improving international relations was, starting
around 1999, offset by other factors causing the military budgets to rise again. This
diploma thesis identified the following factors:
 The development of high-tech military equipment (the “revolution in military
affairs”) led to a cost explosion in the defence sector. Up to date arms can
only be afforded by devoting vast amounts of money to the defence budget.
 Meanwhile, the proliferation of asymmetric conflicts has blurred the line be-
tween war, organised crime and terrorism, and made it more difficult to utilize
superior military strength to win conflicts. Fighting asymmetric conflicts and
pacifying occupied nations proved to be a very costly endeavour, since it re-
quires creating incentives for people not to participate in insurrections.
 The ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are two examples of this develop-
ment. The level of commitment in those wars is an important determinant for
a country’s level of military expenditures.
 The economic rise of developing countries such as China, India, Brazil and
Russia contributed to the rise of worldwide military expenditures in particu-
lar, because poorer countries’ military budgets are stronger affected by GDP
growth than those of industrialized countries.
 NATO members are sensitive to the military build-up in China and Russia
and thus also raised their military expenditures.
 In the industrialized world, there is a negative correlation between economic
well-being and military expenditures. This could indicate that nations use
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military budgets to counter economic downturns, in the case of the five largest
EU economies falling monopoly profits.
 Although there is a connection between scores of politically motivated violence
and military expenditures, terror incidents are not significantly related to arms
build-up in those countries suffering from terrorist attacks.
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Abstract
Although the Cold War has ended about 20 years ago and there are
no open hostilities between the great powers, worldwide military expen-
ditures are constantly rising and have surpassed the peak values of Cold
War military spending in 1987/88. This diploma thesis aims to identify
the causes of this alarming development. To this end, I review theo-
ries on demand for military expenditure throughout history, examine
the changing strategic environment during and after the Cold War and
perform an empirical analysis with panel data on the 40 largest military
powers. The main findings suggest that there are several contributing
factors to increasing military budgets. Among them are the prolifer-
ation of conflicts and overall politically motivated violence since 2001,
such as the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, these conflicts’ charac-
ter as asymmetric warfare, and the economic ascension of many formerly
poor countries.
Zusammenfassung
Obwohl der Kalte Krieg seit 20 Jahren vorbei ist und es keine offenen
Feindschaften zwischen den Großma¨chten gibt, steigen die weltweiten
Milita¨rausgaben konstant an und haben den Ho¨chststand wa¨hrend des
Kalten Krieges 1987/88 bereits u¨bertroffen. Die vorliegende Diplomar-
beit versucht die Ursachen dieser alarmierenden Entwicklung zu identi-
fizieren. Zu diesem Zweck diskutiere ich Theorien fu¨r die Nachfrage nach
Ru¨stungsausgaben im Lauf der Geschichte, untersuche die wechselnde
strategische Umgebung wa¨hrend und nach dem Kalten Krieg und fu¨hre
eine empirische Analyse mit Paneldaten der 40 gro¨ßten Milita¨rma¨chte
durch. Die Hauptergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass es mehrere Fak-
toren gibt, die zu steigenden Milita¨retats fu¨hren. Darunter fallen die
Verbreitung von Konflikten und allgemein politisch motivierter Gewalt
seit 2001 wie die Interventionen in Afghanistan und im Irak, der Charak-
ter dieser Konflikte als asymmetrische Kriege und der wirtschaftliche
Aufstieg vieler ehemals armer La¨nder.
